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Communication Studies

The War on Terror, M iddle-East Peace, and a Drive around the Ranch: the Rhetoric o f
US-Saudi Diplomacy after 9-11
Chairperson: Dr. Shiv Ganesh
In a rhetorical examination o f the communicative phenomenon o f diplomacy, this study
analyzes White House rhetorical strategy following a meeting between George W. Bush
and the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. An analysis o f White House statements following
the April 25, 2002 meeting reveals the use o f two rhetorical strategies used to promote
US-Saudi policy: prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984) and domestication (Schiappa, 1989).
In one collection o f appeals, for example, White House rhetoric makes use o f a prophetic
dualism (1984) in highlighting the ‘importance’ o f the relationship to peace in the
Middle-East and in A m erica’s ‘war on terror.’ Here, I argue, official rhetoric creates a
new rendition o f the Cold War Drama (Stuckey, 1995) with reference to a new rhetorical
backdrop provided by the ‘war on terror.’ In a second strategy, official rhetoric
domesticates (Schiappa, 1989) the US-Saudi partnership by describing the relationship
through a set o f relational metaphors. Here, I argue, W hite House rhetoric expands
previous notions o f domestication through the use o f themes like mutual appreciation,
shared respect, and personal bonding to personify the relationship. In light o f these new
adaptations o f rhetorical strategy, scholars must continue to explore the innovations and
new uses o f Hybrid strategies (Stuckey, 1995) as they appear in foreign policy address.
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The War on Terror, Middle-East Peace, and a Drive around the Ranch: the Rhetoric of
US-Saudi Diplomacy after 911

The major communicative problem this study will examine is one embedded in a
complex multi-faceted relationship between two world powers: the United States and
Saudi Arabia. From the 1930s until the present, the U S’s relationship with this leading
Arab oil producer has satisfied a number of its most vital economic and strategic
interests. In the post September 11th period, the American public’s increased concern
over national security and the war on terror has given rise to a number of public
criticisms of its relations with Arab countries, in particular Saudi Arabia because of its
unique proximity to the events of 9-11. Nonetheless, the United States continues to
legitimate and promote its policy toward this long-time ally which is a vital economic and
strategic partner (Baer, 2003; Unger, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). The Saudi Kingdom,
however, maintains a conflicted relationship with the United States that poses a challenge
to these efforts.
On the one hand, the Saudis remain the key exporter of US energy needs through
their vast petroleum reserves. In addition, they continue to play an integral strategic role
in US foreign policy through their accommodation of US troops stationed in the
Kingdom as well as their active partnership in several extensive clandestine military
operations. Their key support of US energy and strategic interests is balanced however,
by their ties to Islamic terrorism and their questionable role in the September 11th attacks.
The Kingdom’s allegiance with Wahhabi Islam, its funding for religious schools that
preach anti-American rhetoric, and its role in sustaining what some experts have called a
hot-bed of Muslim extremism have invited criticism from audiences in the US and
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abroad. Taken together, these conflicting views of the relationship bring great difficulty
to the task of promoting a pro-Saudi position in the US. For the Bush White House, this
task is even more challenging because of the Bush fam ily’s close ties to the House of
Saud.
In terms of its social and political importance, the US-Saudi relationship deserves
scholarly attention because of its impact on global events and world history. This
relationship has played a role in many major world events -th e emergence of the global
oil market, World W ar II, the Cold War, the Iran-Iraq war, ongoing Israeli-Palestinian
conflicts, the creation of OPEC, the Afghan wars, the rise of fundamentalist terrorism,
Osama bin Laden, and the attacks of September 11th, to name a few. At the same time,
despite the magnitude of this relationship’s impact on world affairs, its stature in public
discourse has often been diminished and frequently over-simplified. Pundits and critics
frequently refer to the “oil weapon,” the “Saudi Vote,” or “Bandar Bush,” which all make
the simplistic suggestion that the Saudis have an influential presence with US policy
makers simply because they own us (Michael M oore’s “George of Arabia” Rolling Stone,
Oct. 30, 2003). In fact, critics frequently ignore the multiplicity of interests involved in
the relationship, assuming that oil is the only motivating factor. Indeed, as I will discuss
in this thesis, the real nature of US Saudi relations is much more complex and
ambiguous, involving multiple national and corporate interests, numerous historical
variables, explosive regional influences, and ongoing domestic political developments in
both W ashington and Riyadh -a ll over the course of a 60-year partnership. Despite the
relationship’s complexities and subtleties, its appearance in public discourse has been
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condensed; for this reason, an examination of the rhetoric surrounding this diplomatic
relationship can help inform current and future public discourse.
As a communicative phenomenon, the rhetoric surrounding this relationship
offers a unique opportunity for scholars to explore intersections between history and
public discourse. For rhetorical scholars, particularly those focusing on foreign policy
rhetoric, this study will add to current understanding of the rhetorical forms and strategies
that officials use to support foreign policy and diplomatic relations. Also promising is an
enriched explanation of how foreign policy rhetoric relates to the historical context in
which it is situated.
In terms of theoretical value, the academic community should find additional
significance in a study that addresses both international relations and communication
issues respectively. US-Saudi diplomacy involves a number of issues that should attract
researchers in both fields, from geopolitical energy and security issues to intercultural,
rhetorical, and organizational discourse. Further, considering the unique issues rooted
within diplomatic relationships like this one, it should come as no surprise that at the
National Communication Association’s most recent national conference several scholars
made the case for better integrating these two unique disciplines (Albert, 2004; Dimitrov,
2004; Harper, 2004; Hayden, 2004; Shuter, 2004; Yook, 2004). Hence, the topic of USSaudi relations carries added significance for communication scholars interested in fusing
the two disciplines for the purpose of gaining greater clarity through inter-disciplinary
collaboration.
As its chief objective, however, this study aims to explore the communicative
phenomenon of diplomacy. Because it is the primary communicative vehicle through
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which governments interact, it serves the academy, the public, and the international
community to better understand and conceptualize the intricate nuances of this dynamic
human process. Serving this interest, an inquiry into the US-Saudi relationship may help
facilitate a deepened consideration of diplomatic interactions in other international
situations.
It is important to look at the relationship between official rhetoric about US-Saudi
diplomacy and its overall historical context because it offers a telling account of one of
the most influential global relationships of the 20th century. Indeed, this unique
relationship has played a pivotal role in historical events o f the past century and beyond.
From World W ar II to the 1973 oil embargo, and through the Israel-Palestinian conflict to
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, this relationship has had tremendously influential
economic, political, strategic, and cultural dimensions. From the September 11th attacks,
to the war in Iraq; from the recruitment, funding, and training of A1 Qaeda and Osama
Bin Laden to the stabilization o f Oil Prices during the US incursion into Iraq, the Saudis
have played a defining role. Therefore, to better understand America’s past, as well as its
forthcoming role in international affairs, an examination of the rhetoric of US-Saudi
affairs will offer an insightful view of this key partnership.
To this end, I will take a rhetorical approach in analyzing the messages used to
promote and legitimate the US-Saudi relationship in the post-9-11 period. Here, the
study will examine the strategies evident in official White House rhetoric in high-level
diplomatic meetings with the Saudis. Hence, the study’s first and second formal
questions arise:
[RQ-1]: How does official rhetoric relate to the overall historical context of USSaudi relations?
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[RQ-2]: W hat strategies have President Bush and other White House officials
used to discuss the US-Saudi relationship during the post-September 11th period?

In the remainder of this chapter, I will review relevant literature on the rhetorical forms of
foreign policy rhetoric before addressing the historical analysis required to answer RQ1.
Next, I will discuss the methods this study will employ, including a description of its data
corpus.

Literature Review
A study that combines historical research with rhetorical analysis requires a
unique blend of previous research. In order to address RQ1,1 will provide a brief
overview of US-Saudi relations to 1) summarize the major characteristics and key
dimensions of the relationship, and 2) address the relevance of these themes in light of
official rhetoric. Here, a comprehensive review of US-Saudi relations (discussed below
on p. 23) will identify key events and trends throughout the relationship’s history.
Several key historical sources will provide the foundation for the history chapter, and are
discussed below in the methods section.
In order to answer RQ 2, a comprehensive review of rhetorical strategy is too
extensive and unnecessary for this study. However, to provide theoretical background to
explore this second question, I will rely upon a specific genre of public address research
within the larger field of rhetorical theory. Within this literature, a considerable volume
of scholarship has examined rhetorical conventions of foreign policy address (Ivie, 1980;
Wander, 1984; Schiappa, 1989; Stuckey, 1995; Hoolihan, 1986). I will review previous
scholarship on foreign policy rhetoric, paying close attention to studies that explore
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various rhetorical strategies situated within the context of international affairs. Below, I
will outline several of the strategies identified by these authors before explaining how
they will inform the rhetorical analysis.

Rhetorical Strategies in Foreign Policy Rhetoric
Previous scholarship identifies three conventional strategies evident in foreign
policy rhetoric: value-oriented, pragmatic, and hybrid. The primary distinction between
these strategies is seen in their reliance on moralistic, value-oriented descriptions versus
pragmatic interest-based explanations. This chapter will first outline examples of several
value-oriented strategies and the various descriptive appeals that support them. Next, I
will turn to examples of pragmatic strategies and their accompanying appeals which
embody distinct metaphoric descriptions of international affairs. Finally, I will discuss a
third hybrid strategy that combines elements of both value-oriented and pragmatic
strategies. By way of introduction, a brief description of each strategy is in order.
Value-oriented strategies become evident when official justifications for foreign
policy appeal to moralistic or dramatized notions of good and evil, right and wrong, or
fear and redemption (Studkey, 1995; Bostdorff, 2003; Wander, 1984). For example,
Bostdorff (2003) has explored President B ush’s use of moral and religious metaphors to
frame foreign policy decisions in the Post-September 11th period. In what Stuckey
(1995) describes as a foreign policy drama, Bush describes the U S’s war on terror in
distinctly moralistic terms, describing our “crusade” against the “evildoers,” and need for
a new national mission to combat this external evil (Bostdorff, 2003, 293, 303; Bush, Jan.
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29, 2002). These value-laden strategies dramatize foreign policy issues and allow for
appeals to moral values that are commonly recognized by the general public.
In other cases, official rhetoric uses a pragmatic strategy that focuses on ‘national
interest.’ For example, in George H.W. Bush’s announcement of the invasion of Iraq, he
emphasized the importance of protecting Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, two key sources of
oil (Hilsman, 1992). Outlining the nation’s vital interests in the Saudi oil supply and the
secondary interest of protecting Israel, Bush appealed to the notion of national interests
rather than a dramatized struggle between good and evil. Pragmatic strategies rely on
appeals to a more rational sense of national interest, mutual benefit between nations, and
other themes that fit within a realist’s framework of international affairs and foreign
policy respectively.

Drama, Morality, and Value-Oriented Strategies
Value-oriented strategies rely on a number of descriptive metaphors, which vary
depending upon the subject matter and its historical context. The victimage ritual for
example, is a rhetorical strategy that has frequently appeared in US justifications for
military action (Ivie, 1980). Ivie (1980) identified what he called “victimage rhetoric,”
wherein the Johnson administration justified the Vietnam W ar through the use of a
savagery metaphor (1980, 279). This metaphor emphasized the distinction between
moral and amoral, right and wrong, and good and evil, allowing for moralistic judgments
to justify military action. Johnson’s rhetoric created the impression that the US was
drawn into conflict by North-Vietnamese communists who posed an imminent and
unprovoked threat to the free world, a depiction fueled by the fear o f an unknown danger
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threatening the free world as per t h e ‘domino theory’ (1980,279). Casting Am erica’s
communist opponents as violent and aggressive, and contrasting them with an image of
the US as a reluctant free nation acting out of last-resort, the administration utilized this
“victimage” ritual outlined by Kenneth Burke (1954; 1967), to justify the US incursion
into Viet Nam. This “victimage” strategy relied on several different descriptive
metaphors.
The Johnson administration described the U S’s actions by juxtaposing three
different dramatic metaphors: force vs. freedom, irrational vs. rational, and aggression vs.
defense -a ll fitting within larger topoi of savagery (Ivie, 1980, 279). Although each
metaphor appealed to a general sense o f right and wrong, good and evil, etc., they were
each distinct metaphors deserving individual discussion.
The force vs. freedom m otif relies upon a portrait of one’s adversaries as
“unspeaking brutes who know no respect for human liberty” (Ivie, 1980, 288). This
metaphor dramatizes on one hand, a forceful and brutish enemy to contrast a hesitant but
noble nation who values freedom on the other. The contrast arises in President Johnson’s
depiction of the looming communist threat as a violent and forceful opponent who
necessitated a response from the US in the interest of preserving freedom.
Similarly, the irrational vs. rational dichotomy built upon the notion of an
“unspeaking brute” by emphasizing the irrationality of communist aggression. This
dichotomy characterized the communist threat as an “irrational and lawless antagonist in
opposition to a rational and law-abiding protagonist” (288). The notion of irrationality
attached to the aggressor helped justify the notion of a ‘rational’ response and also helped
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bolster the public’s impression of the use of American force to stop this apparently
unwitting aggressor.
The aggression vs. defense motif is a little different in its rhetorical orientation
because it attempts to establish a cause-effect situation in which the US is responding to
an aggressive threat; hence the U S’s actions appear involuntary as opposed to voluntary
(290). It builds upon notions of force vs. freedom and rationality vs. irrationality, to
support a specific military action. The metaphor describes US intervention as a defensive
maneuver as opposed to an offensive one. Perhaps only by constructing an apparently
forceful, irrational, and aggressive nation can officials claim that an American incursion
is a defensive response to a looming aggressor as it were. Strategically, each of these
three metaphors fits within the same conception of warfare, in which the U S’s adversaries
are cast as antagonists against a monstrous aggressor. The US and its allies can appear a
reluctant protagonist drawn into a seemingly unavoidable conflict. Other value-oriented
strategies describe conflict through similar dramatic metaphors.
Phillip W ander (1984) identified a strategy he called “prophetic dualism,” which
bears close resemblance to victimage rhetoric (1980). This rhetorical strategy describes
the larger context of a particular conflict or foreign policy scenario through the use of
moralistic dualisms like good vs. evil and right vs. wrong. Employed by the EisenhowerDulles administration, prophetic dualism “divides the world in to two cam ps... One side
... is good, decent, and at one with G od’s will. The other acts in direct opposition,” and
the resulting conflict between the two is solved only by the victory o f good over evil
(Wander, 1984, 342). Like Ivie’s force vs. freedom m otif (1980), the adversary is
depicted as acting in discord with universal notions of “freedom,” “morality,” and

•
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“universal good” (1984). This strategy also appeals to a religious or moral conception of
good and evil, as one side must appear “good, decent, and at one with G od’s will” (1980,
342). Indeed, both strategies rely upon the assumption that the world is divided into
different parties with simple, clear, objectives -o n e right, and one wrong, good and evil,
etc. This reliance upon a morally-dichotomous depiction of the world appears in another
dramatic strategy employed during the Cold War.
Exploring what she called foreign policy drama, Stuckey (1995) explored another
value-oriented strategy, the Cold W ar drama. Employing this strategy, supported by the
use of W ander’s prophetic dualism (1984), officials described the US-Soviet conflict
appealing to similar notions of good and evil used during the Viet Nam war. Officials
created a dualism between good and evil, best seen in President Reagan’s famous
depiction of the Soviet Union as the “evil empire.” Aided by the Soviet Union’s fervent
suppression of religious freedom, this metaphor was particularly salient because of its
ability to frame a complex international situation into simplistic dichotomy between good
and evil (Stuckey, 1995). So in part, this characterization operated as a kind of
simplification mechanism by interpreting a complex set of historical and political
circumstances into a condensed and easily-understood moral metaphor (1995).
Simplification also occurs through another type of value-oriented strategy
Schiappa (1989) called Nuke Speak, or “the use of metaphor, euphemism, technical
jargon, and acronyms to portray nuclear concepts in a neutral or positive way” (253).
Schiappa (1989) studied President Reagan’s explanations of nuclear weaponry to find
two different value-oriented strategies: domestication and bureaucratization.
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During the Reagan Administration, defense officials used a domestication strategy
which relied upon “everyday language to describe the extraordinary in ordinary terms”
(Schiappa, 1989, 255). Examples of this strategy appeared in rhetoric that used “friendly
metaphors drawn from ordinary language to name otherwise objectionable nuclear
weapons, strategy, and war” (255). During this period, atomic bombs that neutralized
the populations of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki for example, bore the names “Fat M an,”
and “Little Boy” in an attempt to normalize this extraordinary technology (1989, 255256). Words and phrases like “clean,” “super,” “smart,” “hardware,” “arms race,” and
others were used to describe various weapons and strategy to the public (255-266). In
sum, Schiappa wrote, “the rhetorical significance of domestication is that it normalizes
extraordinary technology.”
Bureacratization also normalized the extraordinary, but without readily
identifiable metaphors. As Schiappa (1989) explained, “Bureaucratization is the
counterpart to domestication” when “nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, or nuclear war
cannot be conveyed persuasively through the use of friendly metaphors” (256). In such
cases, this strategy attempts “either to sanitize the concept so that it appears neutral and
inoffensive, or to technologize the concept” through the use of “technical terms or
acronyms that only insiders or ‘experts’” may truly grasp (1989, 256-257). A senior
military official, for example, described the Titan 2 missile as “a very large, potentially
disruptive re-entry system’” (1989, 257). In another example, officials called the neutron
bomb a “ ‘radiation enhancement weapon’” (1989, 257). Showing a similar instance,
Schiappa offered the following list of prominent acronyms used to describe various
weapons and technology: MIRV, MARY, ASW, ICBM, SLBM, GLCM, LOW, LUA,
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ELF, EMP, ERW, PAL, MAD, SDI, SBKKV, SALT, BMD, and START (1989, 257).
The effect of these descriptions, according to Schiappa, “is to mystify -to render nuclear
policy irrelevant or inaccessible to public investigation and deliberation”(257).
Strategically, these simplistic metaphors operate rhetorically in much the same fashion as
domestication strategies.
Although domestication and bureaucratization are value-oriented strategies, they
function differently than other strategies like prophetic dualism and the cold war drama.
Domestication and bureaucratization function negate or neutralize value; rather than
dramatize they nearly trivialize. Unlike dramatic dualisms between good and evil, etc.,
‘nukespeak’ attempts to lessen the dramatic impact of a particular issue. These strategies
remove value or notions of dramatic appeal in instances in which, Schiappa would argue,
drama may in fact have some merit. As Schiappa wrote, Nukespeak “both for [its] users
and for the public as an audience... functions as a ... ‘terministic screen’” by devaluing
the thing it describes (1989, 253). W hereas other strategies attempt to maximize a certain
value or characteristic, both domestication and bureaucratization function to minimize
these traits. The outcome is akin to a rhetorical camouflage.
Interestingly, each of these value-oriented strategies describes a particular topic
through dramatic narratives like good vs. evil or right vs. wrong. These strategies help
re-describe history or technology through the lens of a certain idea or theme. In this
sense they are both dramatic and metaphorical; they dramatize certain sets of facts or
events and in doing so, help the public understand these subjects though a particular
metaphor. W hether describing an act of war through a morally dichotomous framing, or
using a simple label to reduce moral or ethical questions about nuclear weaponry,
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descriptive metaphors shape lay audience’s understanding of foreign policy issues. They
allow the public to grasp a topic of complex or enormous proportions -w hether a major
international conflict between two global powers, or an advanced piece of weaponry—
through interpretation. In the end, these strategies hinge upon the rhetor’s ability to first,
re-describe the issue or subject in questions, and secondly to reframe the audience’s
perception of it. There are other strategies that re-describe issues much differently.

National Interest and Mutual Benefit: Pragmatic Strategies
Pragmatic strategies do not necessarily filter history through a particular lens, at
least not in the dramatized fashion of other strategies. Rather, pragmatic strategies
explain topics in terms of normative, interest-based rationale. Phillip W ander (1984), for
example, identified a strategy he called “technocratic realism,” which describes global
conflicts in terms of mutual interest and negotiation, favoring “hard-headed calculation”
over simplistic religious or moral framing (349). His examination of the Kennedy
administration’s rhetoric revealed the Administration’s tendency to describe the world in
terms of complex and overlapping national interests rather than good and evil, right and
wrong, etc.. Kennedy’s rhetoric, W ander wrote, “stressed ‘efficiency’ over ‘morality,’”
(349). Kennedy’s use of technocratic realism hinged on descriptions of the modem world
that were “much too complex for old time religion... not the prophet, but rather a skilled,
tough expert is what is needed, one whose mind is untouched by violent and dangerous
emotions; one who is wise, analytical, precise” (1984, 349). Completely antithetical to
value-laden strategies, Kennedy’s rhetorical approach seemed distinctly rational rather
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than moralistic. In this sense the strategy embodied realist approach to international
affairs.
Similarly, Stuckey (1995) explored the use o f pow er politics and new world order
strategies. These strategies describe nations as “equal moral actors,” who attempt to
control conflict and avoid confrontation in the interests of the broader international
system, as opposed to an explicit, over-arching moral good (216). “Instead of a war to the
death between good and evil,” Stuckey explained, “the new world order posits fluctuating
levels of conflict between a variety of equally ethical alternatives” (217). These
descriptions appeal to a sense of realism and fact, and emphasize secular justifications for
military action, rather than contrasting moral dilemmas outlined above (217). Here, the
power politics metaphor describes international relations by emphasizing opportunities
for negotiation based on mutual self-interest between sovereign national actors (Stuckey,
1995; Wander, 1984). In terms o f framing, pragmatic metaphors do not simplify or
dramatize international events; rather, they acknowledge the complexities and
overlapping considerations of the parties involved in explaining justifications for
decision-making. While not amoral, per se, this strategy favors rational rather than moral
framing.

Values meet Pragmatism: Hybrid Strategies
While value-oriented and pragmatic strategies can operate independently, they
can also function in tandem with one another. Stuckey (1995) described how official
rhetoric sometimes combines both strategies to create a kind of composite hybrid
strategy. George H.W. Bush, for example, explained international conflicts through the
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use of both ‘Cold W ar drama’ and ‘new world order metaphors’ (Stuckey, 1995, 218).
As Stuckey wrote, Bush “tended to combine the dichotomous moralism of the Cold War
drama and its ... prophetic dualism with the cooperation demanded by the rhetorical
forms of the new world order drama” (Stuckey, 1995, 218). The new world order drama
stems in part from this notion of collective order; it rests on the assumption that a larger
international coalition of peaceful states attempts to live in accord western notions of
democracy (1995). By contrast, President Bill Clinton employed a hybrid that coupled
the power politics and cold war metaphors (1995, 221). Combined with the Cold War
narrative, the power politics model emphasizes national actors balancing power against
hegemonic forces like the former Soviet Union (1995). Here, a moral dichotomy
necessitates a pragmatic interaction between States sharing mutual interest in balancing
power against a global threat to freedom (1995). These hybrids can be effective because
they may appeal to both a strong sense of morality while also appealing to a sense of
rational pragmatism - a blend of idealism and realism.
In sum, varying arrangements of value-oriented and pragmatic strategies provide
a comprehensive framework for the following examination of official rhetoric on USSaudi policy. Existing literature is critical of official rhetoric as such messages seem to
distill information to the public through a number of rhetorical strategies: value-oriented,
pragmatic, and hybrid. Moreover, whether interpreting developments through a value
laden lens, or explaining key topics in interest-based terms, official foreign policy
statements frame and shape issues through the strategic use of language and rhetorical
forms, acting as a kind of ‘terministic screen.’ In the rhetorical analysis below, this study
will rely upon the literature reviewed above as a basis for interpreting the strategies in
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President George W. Bush’s rhetoric in the context of US-Saudi diplomacy after
September 11th, 2001.

Methods
To answer RQ1, which elucidates a connection between official rhetoric and its
overall historical/political context, I read a number of historical, political, and
international texts that describe the intricate history of US-Saudi relations. From these
texts, I assembled a rough timeline of the relationship, beginning in the late 1930s. In
doing so, I chose to focus on the major themes and developments o f this relationship by
highlighting its dimensions and functions. I was most interested in developments that
characterized the interests and motivations of the parties, be they strategic, financial,
political, cultural, or economic.
In terms of sources, I chose historical accounts according to two criteria. First,
each source was selected based on its ability to provide a unique or previously
undeveloped account of a particular aspect of the relationship, either from personal
experience or through academic expertise. For example, Richard Clarke’s (2004)
testimony comes from his direct experience as the FB I’s counter-terrorism director
during several key periods in the relationship. He was directly involved in the hunt for
Osama bin Laden, negotiations with Saudi diplomatic and military leadership, and the
nation’s response to the events of September 11, 2001. Clarke, along with several others,
offers unique personal experience with several key issues within the US-Saudi
relationship.
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Others may lack such personal experience but still demonstrate a distinct
expertise with certain facets o f the US-Saudi relationship. Historian Craig Unger (2004),
for example, has extensively covered the Bush-Saudi relationship. Writing on the Bushes
and conservative politics for the New Yorker, Esquire, and Vanity Fair, Unger has also
served as editor for the New York Observer and Boston Magazine. Unger’s book, House
o f Bush, House o fS a u d (2004) focuses exclusively on the development of the Bush-Saudi
partnership within the larger context of US-Saudi diplomacy. His heavy reliance on
primary sources, extensive and corroborated interviews with direct participants and
public officials, and his distinctive reputation as a journalist bolster his credibility when
discussing the Bush-Saudi component of the US-Saudi partnership. Although the book
became controversial because of allegations of unethical motives and impropriety via the
Bush-Saudi family connections, it has withstood criticisms due mainly to the gregarious
and well-documented nature o f its research. The book’s primary weakness, from a
researcher’s perspective, was its apparent intent to expose a particularly negative aspect
of the relationship. Nonetheless, his testimony was corroborated by other accounts of the
relationship (Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004). I selected Unger’s book, like others, because it
offered a previously undeveloped account of a specific aspect of the US-Saudi
relationship.
Secondly, I chose texts that showed extensive reliance upon primary sources,
personal accounts, interviews, and corroborative evidence. Robert Baer (2002, 2003), for
example, frequently cites de-classified government documents, personal interviews with
unique sources, and corroborated evidence to support his testimony. Additionally, Baer’s
career as a foreign case officer with the CIA gives him background knowledge of recent
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and ongoing Middle-Eastern affairs that may surpass those available to a professional
journalist or historian. For these reasons, Baer is an example of a source that was chosen
in part for his methods and sources.
To address RQ2,1 explored the post-9-11 period for a major incident involving
the Saudis that was accompanied by a public response from the White House. I found a
handful, the most fruitful of which was the Crawford address of late April, 2002, which
proved ripe for analysis. Although officials previously fielded questions about the
relationship during press briefings, only at this specific address did the President offer a
speech that directly approached the issue in positive terms. For instance, instead of
answering questions about the US-Saudi policy, the President focuses an entire speech
around the issue, making an affirmative persuasive effort on the subject.
As it followed a historical high-level diplomatic meeting with the Crown Prince
Abdallah, who previously turned down invitations to meet with the President, the speech
had an immediate historical and diplomatic context. The speech occurred in the midst of
several important historical developments: heightened conflict in the W est Bank, an
approaching war in Iraq, and increasing speculation and volatility in world energy
markets. Adding to the text’s ripeness were several official statements made in the days
following the address that echoed the President’s key messages. For these reasons I
chose a data corpus that included 3 Presidential speeches, 3 White House press briefings,
and one speech by the White House National Security Advisor all occurring between
April 25 and May 2, 2002. Other incidents, most notably the public exposure of an FBI
investigation into allegations that Princess Haifa had indirectly funded several 9-11
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hijackers, failed to produce the same volume of official discourse as the Crawford
address.
In terms of a timeline, the data corpus begins on April 25, when President Bush
gave a speech to report on his meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah at the Bush’s
family ranch outside of Crawford Texas. The next two addresses were given by the
President on April 26th, and 28th at the same location. On the 29th, Dr. Condoleezza Rice,
then National Security Advisor, gave a speech at Johns Hopkins University where she
addressed the recent meeting between Bush and Abdullah. Also included were two
White House press briefings held at the Crawford Ranch by Press Secretary Ari Fleischer
on May 1st and 2nd. Taken together, these statements created a more detailed mosaic of
White House strategy by illustrating a cumulative message that was consistent throughout
several texts.
In terms of objectivity and neutrality, I should discuss several items. First, this
study makes no attempt to present, nor does it intend to imply any moral judgm ent or
ethical decision about the veracity or advisability of US-Saudi Policy. Indeed, this study
acknowledges that the US-Saudi relationship is deeply embedded in issues of national
security, economic stability, middle-eastern security, global terrorism, high-level
corruption, deeply-seeded religious sentiment, and world peace. Considering the
magnitude of these issues in concert with ongoing developments in the geo-political
community, I do not claim to possess unique knowledge or insight that should qualify me
to make any such moral or ethical conclusions about US-Saudi policy. Hopefully this
project will better explain the communicative dimensions of the relationship, allowing
other scholars to address extended topics in future research.
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Secondly, the historical portion of this project is in no way an exhaustive account
of US-Saudi relations, Middle Eastern affairs, Wahhabi Islam, the Bush-Saudi family
connections, or of US policy toward the Middle East. Rather, Chapter II simply attempts
to describe and appreciate the many dimensions of a complex diplomatic and private
relationship for the purpose o f comparing this history to official rhetoric. There are
certainly a number of historical, political, and strategic factors that will remain outside
the scope of public knowledge, and this study makes no attempt to unearth or corroborate
them. Rather, this study attempts to expand knowledge and understanding of the
communicative process that enables functional diplomacy. More specifically, this is a
study of strategic communication in an international setting between national actors, so it
must observe rhetorical function with a constant eye to history and the circumstances that
surround diplomatic actors.
Third, as a researcher, I bring to this study a number of assumptions about the
US-Saudi partnership and the relationship between official rhetoric and extant foreign
policy. The US-Saudi relationship, contrary to the arguments of detractors, does
facilitate the U S’s vital interests. Through its supply of foreign oil alone, the Saudi
Kingdom supports the US economy and the chosen -a lb e it Locke-inspired, lifestyles of
Americans in ways of which the public is either unaware or unappreciative. Although I
find it difficult to condone the U S’s gluttonous consumption of oil and petroleum
products, I recognize that the US-Saudi partnership facilitates these fundamental needs of
US citizens. Until demand drops, supply must court its rise; and hence, the US-Saudi
partnership continues to be justified as a necessity to the U S’s vital energy interests.
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To make a judgment about the relationship’s political advisability is equally
troublesome. On one hand, critics point out that the US-Saudi relationship is doomed
because of US troops stationed on Muslim holy land. This issue continues to motivate
acts of terrorism against US and W estern targets across the globe. The rise of W ahhabist
Islam in Saudi Arabia and the US compounds this dilemma. Additionally, some regional
experts have argued that the Saudi Kingdom is ripe for regime change and will soon fall
taking with it the U S’s greatly-valued oil supply. For these and other reasons, detractors
would argue that the US-Saudi policy is politically inadvisable because it broaches on a
risk to national security.
On the other hand, proponents will argue that so long as US energy needs
predicate a close military and diplomatic relationship with the Saudis, the White House
must continue a pro-Saudi policy. They would argue that a pro US-Saudi policy is
advisable for two primary reasons. First and foremost, the US needs Saudi Oil.
Secondly, if a President were to close its relationship with Saudi Arabia, the price of oil
would skyrocket, and the American public would immediately feel the strain. Moreover,
if such a move prompted a Saudi reaction that included withdrawing its considerable
investments from US markets, the results to the US economy could be staggering. For
these reasons and other reasons, proponents would hold that US-Saudi policy is
politically advisable in the face of daunting alternative courses of action.
I also assume that White House rhetoric will, and should, support extant foreign
policy. Although certain policies will always receive criticism for moral, political, or
other reasons, this should never preclude officials from supporting the President’s
policies. I do not believe that all policies deserve public justification, but for the
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purposes of a rhetorical analysis, I assume as a matter of organizational reality that White
House rhetorical strategy is designed to promote and legitimate the will of the President
for better or worse.
Lastly, I should outline my position that White House rhetoric is both intentional
and unintentional. As discussed in further detail in Chapter III, I assume that White
House rhetoric is strategic insofar as it is designed with a clear purpose, directed at
particular audiences, and contains appeals and forms designed to persuade. At the same
time, I understand that language and values are inextricably linked; the President’s
rhetoric may unintentionally reflect his or her worldviews, ideology, and political or
social values. This combination of strategy and worldview creates a rhetorical situation
in which the critic must focus on the function of rhetoric rather than attempting to access
the rhetor’s motives. Hence, this study will not examine the psychologies of George W.
Bush and other White House officials, as it focuses on the functions of their rhetoric in a
given historical context.
In terms of chapter structure, Chapter II begins the historical overview of USSaudi relations, which covers the relationship’s emergence in the 1920s and 30s through
its dynamic stages of development in the 1970s, through the late 1990s and into the
September 11th period. Chapter III, the rhetorical analysis, examines the two major
rhetorical strategies apparent in White House rhetoric during and after the Crawford
address of April 25, 2002. Chapter IV contains the discussion and conclusion section of
the study, where I outline the results of the study, its implications in terms of rhetorical
theory, and finally, a recommendation for current and future White House
communication strategy.
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II Historical overview of US-Saudi relations
This chapter describes the major periods and events in US-Saudi relations. First,
the majority of the chapter will review the major periods of interaction between the US
and Saudi governments, arguing that an economic and military partnership emerged in
response to the changing needs of both nations as well as the ongoing forces of history.
The latter portion of this chapter will focus on the financial and political relationships that
connect the Bush family and the Saudi Royal family. There, I will argue that the
relationship involved lucrative Saudi investments in US markets that allowed the Saudis
unique access to Washington power brokers. Finally, I will conclude the chapter with a
discussion of some major themes found in the historical overview that inform the
rhetorical analysis in the following chapter. First, however, it is important to gain an
understanding of the overall rhetorical situation to answer my first research question,
which is: how does official rhetoric relate to the overall historical context of US-Saudi
relations.
To summarize, the relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia gained
prominence with the decline of British influence in the Middle East in the late 1920s
(Klieman, 1970). Soon after, oil was discovered by an American oil company in the
Saudi desert. During W orld W ar II, the US came to rely upon the Saudis for oil, and they
in turn relied upon the US for regional security needs. From there, these two pinnacle
issues -econom ics and security, would expand over decades.
By the beginning of the 21st century, the Saudis were an economic and strategic
partner for the US. Defined by major events during different decades spanning several
US Presidential administrations, the relationship has both endured and reshaped history in
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many ways. During each period of time the US responded to several major regional and
global events by rethinking its relationship with the Saudi Kingdom and how to best
achieve its regional objectives through this partnership. For example, W ashington was
forced to reconsider its position in the Arab world after the 1973 oil embargo, when Arab
states eliminated their supply of oil to the west. Tied to the U S’s support for Israel, the
OPEC embargo made the US rethink how it accomplished its regional goals of balancing
support for Israel with its demand for Arab oil (Quandt, 1987).
Below is an outline of this dynamic relationship, categorized by time period.
Within each time period, this study notes events that had some guiding influence on the
US-Saudi alliance. Although I will not attempt to establish causal relationships between
certain historical factors, I will attempt to describe developments in the relationship that,
on the surface, seem to illustrate the direction, interests, or other fundamental
characteristics of the relationship. For the purposes of this study, I will assume “key
events” to constitute developments that implicate the U S’s vital interests, such as oil
supply, protecting Israel, or maintaining stability and security in either the Middle-East,
globally, or within US borders.
In covering the relationship, I have attempted to be as descriptive as possible, as I
depict the major significant events of the relationship. By way of illustration, I avoid a
comprehensive account of relevant history, which would prove far too demanding.
Indeed, the US-Saudi partnership played a role in the growth of Western industrialism,
every major military conflict since W orld W ar II, and the emergence of the GOP, OPEC,
world energy markets, and global terrorism. Covering each of these topics in detail is
much too cumbersome and unnecessary for this project. Instead, I have attempted to
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focus on the most salient events and developments that predicated and impacted the
relationship, beginning first and foremost, with the discovery o f crude oil in the Arabian
peninsula.
Before discussing the major developments in US-Saudi relations over the past 80
years, a brief overview illustrates the pattern of continual growth this relationship
experienced. Between the 1920s and 60s, the relationship between the two countries
emerged slowly, as the US cultivated a relationship in which it gained a valuable supply
of oil in exchange for providing regional security to the newly-formed Saudi Kingdom.
In the 1970s, the economic and military aspects of the partnership grew in response to
several regional and global developments. Highlighted by the Cold W ar and a looming
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the 1980s saw the US-Saudi relationship deepen through
several clandestine military efforts along with rapid economic development. The 1990s,
notable for the Iraq war, growing Arab anti-westemism, and rising concerns over Osama
bin Laden, showed both the US and its partner the increasing strategic value of Saudi
soil. In the pre-September 11th period, the relationship, or at least the US side, remained
focused on the growing threat of terrorism and the hunt for Osama bin Laden, which
greatly concerned US policy makers. There was also a less formal component to the USSaudi relationship that related exclusively to the Bushes, who had close ties to the house
of Saud. Together, each of these aspects creates an impression of rapid economic,
strategic, and political growth over the several decades of this diplomatic relationship.
All of this dynamic development, however, started with the decline o f British
Imperialism and the discovery o f oil on the Eastern Coast of the Arabian peninsula.
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1920s -1960s: the Formative Years
The 1920s and 30s were the formative years o f the US-Saudi relationship. In an
era when the US was seeking foreign oil supplies and the Saudi Arabian theocratic
monarchy sought military support from a strong ally, the relationship molded around
these two fundamental issues: energy supply and regional security. In this period, the
US-Saudi alliance grew around these two strategic and economic imperatives -th e two
interests that still base the relationship today.
From the 1920s to the late 1930s, both the British and American governments had
jockeyed for position in the Middle East (Coll, 2004; Klieman, 1970). The growing
industrial shape of both British and American societies enhanced their necessity for oil
sources. With the decline of British influence in the emerging Saudi State, and handful
of US actors such as oil investors, explorers, and government diplomats courted the
Saudis to create a partnership whereby the US could retrieve oil from the vast desert
landscape and would allow the Saudis to profit considerably (Coll, 2005; Klieman, 1970).
For the US, the promise of oil solidified in Saudi Arabia on New Y ear’s Day in
1938, at an oil well named “Number Seven,” in the desert location of Damman near the
eastern coast of Saudi-Arabia (Unger, 2004, Appx. B; Baer, 2003, 74). It was there that
Standard Oil of California, otherwise known as SOCAL, drilled its first successful well
and thereby secured its ability to extract oil from the vast Saudi landscape (2003, 74).
This single well would produce over 100,000 barrels in its first two months of operation
(Schwartz, 2003, 124). Owned by John D. Rockefeller, Standard Oil, who owned
SOCAL, had signed an exploration contract with the Saudi Government that placed it in a
position unlike any it had ever fathomed (Baer, 76-77). The contract, signed in King Ibn
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Saud’s behalf by his finance minister in 1933, guaranteed Saudi Arabia lucrative
payments in exchange for the “exclusive r ig h t... to explore, prospect, drill for, extract,
treat, manufacture, transport, deal with, carry away, and export” oil products from
underneath Saudi soil (2003, 76). Offering the Saudis an initial loan, annual rent, and
additional continuing payments upon the discovery of oil, the American company was
promising a sum which today would total over 4.16 million US Dollars (2003, 76).
The Saudi family, whose theocratic monarchy had taken form only years before,
was now being offered more money than it had ever seen or even fathomed. In fact, just
several years earlier, the Saudi finance minister had carried the entire nation’s treasury
around in a small suitcase, in which he deposited the country’s tax revenue from local
farmers, traders, and merchants in exchange for a hand-written receipt of credit (Baer,
2003, 76). But public finance systems would be the least of the Royal family’s concerns
in the following decades, when its relationship with the west would flourish, offering
them more high-level attention from American politicians and policy-makers.
Following the initial profit the country made from oil sales to the west, the 1940s
marked Saudia Arabia’s initial entry into the sphere of international politics, as Great
Britain and the United States competed for Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves and strategic
location (Baer 2003, 76-77; Unger, 2004, 3; Crile, 2003). In 1944, a Japanese invasion of
Burma and Indonesia closed two key oil sources for the US, boosting Saudi Arabia’s
importance to the West (Baer, 2003, 77). The US drastically increased its diplomatic
efforts toward the Saudis and offered an aid package which totaled nearly $100 million
(Baer, 2003, 78). This was an attractive offer to Saudi Arabia, which needed a western
partner to secure its safety within the region and was worried about Britain’s imperialistic
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tendencies when considering its post-war position (Baer, 2003, 81). The US quickly
capitalized on this need, and in 1945 offered Saudi Arabia an oil-for-security deal
whereby the US helped Saudi-Arabia’s regional security needs if the Saudis agreed to
maintain their supply of oil to the United States (Unger, 289; Baer, 2003, 81-84; Crile,
2003).
This deal culminated in a secret meeting between the President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and King Abdul Aziz aboard the USS Quincy over Valentine’s Day of 1945,
when the two countries cemented their interests in a military-economic pact that secured
a trade of oil supply to the west in exchange for a guarantee of US military support within
the region (Unger, 2004; Baer, 2003; Crile, 2003, 238).
By 1945, US and Allied forces had nearly tripled their consumption of Saudi
crude as its yearly output reached 21.3 million barrels just several years after its first oil
well had appeared (Baer, 2003, 77). By then, the US-Saudi relationship clearly took on
significant economic and strategic characteristics; the US maintained a steady demand for
oil, and the Saudis began to depend upon the US for regional security. The following
period between 1945 and the mid-1950s would be characterized by massive oil purchases
from US oil companies who would stockpile vast domestic reserves, hoping to meet
growing US demand with foreign supply. The stockpiling trend would characterize USSaudi relations through the next decade, until 1960, when the Eisenhower
Administration’s clamp on oil imports would offset this profitable trajectory. (2003, 77,
79,86-87)
The Saudi position in this relationship would gain great leverage however, with
the creation of OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, in 1960.
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An oil cartel comprised of the major Arab oil producing countries of the Middle East,
OPEC greatly increased its members’ bargaining power with the West (86-87). This
power allowed member countries like Saudi Arabia to control the amount of oil they sent
to the West, and in an event that impacted the United States’ economy and foreign policy
position, they fully exercised this authority years later in the oil embargo o f 1973.

1970s: Oil supply, global strategy, and bi-lateral cooperation
The 1970s both deepened and complicated the US-Saudi relationship. The
economic and strategic interests upon which the partnership was founded began to bring
unforeseen risks to the US both in terms of its energy supply as well as its strategic
position within the Arab region. More specifically, the 1970s marked several regional
developments that moved the two countries toward greater interdependence. As
discussed in this section, a rise in terrorist threats, an Arab attack on Israel in 1973, a
debilitating oil embargo shortly thereafter, and a looming Soviet presence broadened both
the economic and military dimensions of the US-Saudi alliance. Perhaps for these
reasons, the United States deepened its ties to Saudi Arabia by rapidly modernizing the
Saudi economy and military.

Rapid Modernization
On the economic front, US domestic oil production plateaued in 1970, yet its
heavy domestic consumption of petrol-products was continuing to increase, which some
policy analysts argued placed the US in a vulnerable economic position (Quandt, 1987).
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Although evidence suggests conservative voices heard at institutions like Brookings
supported this notion of vulnerability, others have raised questions about its validity.
Recent scholarship, such as works by Rocky Mountain Institute founders Hunter and
Amory Lovins make a different argument. In a 2001 Foreign Affairs essay, these
analysts argued that the ‘vulnerability’ thesis is primarily the result o f a one-sided supplyside approach (Lovins & Lovins, 2001). They point to successful demand-side solutions
like those implemented by President Carter to reduce US dependence on Arab oil (2001).
Following the Carter Administration’s demand-side efforts at fuel efficiency and
alternative energy, as well as differences of opinion over the level o f US vulnerability to
oil shock, both sides agree that the U S’s reliance on Arab oil production began to have
more serious implications for policy makers (Lovins & Lovins, 2001; Quandt, 1981). The
U S’s energy and security needs would increasingly overlap with its interests in the
region.
On the military front, US support for Israel began to provoke a dramatic response
from the Arab world. As the US would realize in 1973, its support for Israel following
the Six Day War in 1967 would provoke tremendous backlash from the Arab world in a
way the US had never anticipated. In fact, three major inter-related developments —the
Yom Kippur war, the 1973 oil embargo, and the rise of fundamentalist terror
organizations, would add to a list of US concerns about Middle-East strategy and regional
security (Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003).
The Saudi Kingdom was an unlikely partner; beyond its ability to supply oil to the
west and facilitate a US defensive presence when in need, the Kingdom might not present
itself as a pinnacle priority of US foreign policy. Described by many authors as
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backward, undeveloped, and deeply attached to a rigid interpretation of Islam, Saudi
society was still barely emerging from a vast landscape still widely inhabited by nomadic
tribes and clustered villages (Baer, 2004; Schwartz, 2003; Crile, 2003). In fact, despite
the Royal family’s immense wealth, by 1974, the Saudi Government was still using goats
as a trash removal system on city and village streets (Perkins, 2004, 81). Like the State’s
belief that its royal subjects should not have to pick up trash, the rulers followed what one
author called “puritanical idealism;” women were still required to be fully covered;
religious police enforced 5 daily prayer obligations; public executions, be-headings, and
stonings are common practice (2004, 81-82). Even today, public beheadings continue in
the frequently-noted plaza affectionately referred to as “Chop-Chop Square” (Baer, 2003;
Perkins, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). Yet despite the fact that Saudi society did not fit the
image o f a “first world” partner to the west, some policy experts saw Saudi
“backwardness” as an opportunity for rapid modernization and a closer relationship with
the US (Wells, 1976; Quandt, 1981; Perkins, 2004). In fact, a major “oil shock” would
quickly re-cast the U S’s interests in aligning itself even closer to this seemingly
backward nation.
Many remember the Oil Embargo of 1973. W ith US domestic oil production
peaking its capacity in 1970, the stage was set for the second major event in US-Saudi
relations when US oil imports, to the disadvantage of the Saudis, had greatly diminished
as a result of oil-import restrictions imposed under the Eisenhower administration
(Unger, 2004, 289; Baer, 2003, 86-87). W ith their sales to the west waning, the Saudis
were about to get a chance to drastically improve their advantage by completely cuttingoff the flow of oil to the US.
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On October 6, 1973, a sacred Jewish holiday, Egypt and Syria launched
simultaneous attacks on Israel which initiated what is now called the Yom Kippur war.
In addition, to counter the U S’s strong support for Israel, the six major Arab oil
producers, including Saudi Arabia, announced a 70 percent increase in oil prices on
October 16, just ten days later. The cartel pledged to individually cut their supplies to the
west by 5 and even 10 percent. Despite this paralyzing embargo, on October 19,
President Nixon proposed that the US Congress continue to provide another $2.2 billion
in extra aid to Israel on Oct. 19, which prompted a more extreme response from the
Saudis and OPEC: a complete Arab embargo, cutting off all oil shipments to the US.
(Perkins, 2004, 82-83)
This embargo imposed a major shock on US markets, crippling the US economy.
OPEC and Saudi Arabia in particular now exerted tremendous international leverage.
OPEC’s drastic supply cuts however, were not nearly as devastating as the Saudi decision
to additionally reduce future production quotas (Quandt, 1981, 128). As Brookings
analyst W illiam Quandt explained, the extra cut in production created “circumstances that
led to a doubling in the posted price of oil” (1981, 128). As regional expert Robert Baer
put it, the Saudis realized that “Suddenly, the petrodollar spigot acquired new dimensions
-you could open it up to make money, or close it off to make even more” (2003, 87).
Indeed, they did, as oil prices skyrocketed. Between 1970 and 1974, Saudi oil jum ped
from $1.39 a barrel to $8.32 per barrel (Perkins, 2004, 83).
In terms of US-Saudi relations, the embargo represented a moment when Saudi
Arabia would rapidly expand its geo-political influence as a result of US dependency.
The consequences of the Yom Kippur war, the following oil embargo, and the surge of
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Arab oil profits (from 1973-1974, OPEC earnings jum ped from $30 -$105 billion)
completely recast the nature of Saudi influence with the US (Wells, 1976, 1; Quandt,
1981).
The US could have responded in a number of ways. On one hand, the US might
have punished the Saudis for what some could argue was a betrayal of the partnership.
Other accounts however, describe the U S’s attempts to deepen the economic dimensions
of the relationship, in effect drawing itself closer with this apparently unpredictable ally
(Quandt, 1981; Perkins, 2004). In an apparently bold and rapid development strategy, the
US responded to the oil embargo by rapidly modernizing the Saudi infrastructure,
becoming even closer with the Saudi regime. Through both military cooperation and
economic development the partnership would deepen and gain new complexities.
On the financial front, US economists were concerned with preventing future oil
crises and began to assess the potential for Saudi Arabia to experience rapid economic
development, in which the US might play a pivotal and profitable role (Perkins, 2004,
81). The US also pursued a new strategy shortly after the oil embargo which aimed at
exploiting the profits of major Arab oil producers and returning those profits to US
markets (2004, 83-84). One facet of this strategy, for example, entailed Saudi approval
for major spending on infrastructure and military development. Hailed as a landmark
success in international development, the rapid modernization of the Saudi state involved
huge projects including:
-Constructing electrical generators
-Major energy transmission and distribution lines
-Water, sewage, and other pipelines
-new communication networks systems
-transportation systems including major highways
-new airports and improved sea ports
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-large array of service and retail industries
-supporting infrastructure for these services
(Perkins, 2004, 85-86)

In awarding contracts, the Saudis agreed to rely exclusively upon US contractors for
these gigantic projects (2004, 83-84). As mentioned above, the US was trying to transfer
Saudi oil profits back into US markets; by creating a situation in which the Saudis were
paying lucrative contracts to US firms, the US achieved this end but not without some
unique arrangements.
Facilitating this strategy, the US Dept, of Treasury created JECOR, the Saudi
Arabian Joint Economic Commission, whose primary function was to use Saudi
development funds to hire American engineering and construction companies (Perkins,
2004, 84). Ultimately, with no congressional oversight, JECOR spent billions of Saudi
Oil money on lucrative contracts, which effectively transferred these billions into US
markets (2004, 84-85). It is unclear why the operation lacked congressional monitoring,
but this feature of the project allowed greater flexibility in terms of administrative
discretion (2004). Commonly referred to as the Saudi money-laundering affair, the
arrangement was a target for many critics of the US-Saudi relationship and continues to
cause disagreement among experts (2004, 97-98). Perkins (2004), who worked closely
with JECOR during this period, was highly critical of the project and described the U S’s
goals as an attempt to render the Saudi economy “increasingly intertwined with and
dependent upon ours” (2004, 85). Although plausible, this account is balanced by W ells’
(1976) analysis, where he offered the following assessment of the Saudi development
strategy:
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The increase in the export earnings of [OPEC] ... is one of those rare historical
events that fundamentally alter economic and political relationships among
nations and groups of nations. It is inevitable and desirable that these events be
followed by evaluations o f their political and economic consequences... (1976, 1)

He suggests that despite the motivations behind JECOR’s activities, the U S’s intent to
return profits to its own firms inevitably arose from OPEC’s rapid profit gains. While
critics and proponents disagree about whether JECOR’s operations were either inevitable
or opportunistic by design, they both agree that the rapid development o f Saudi
infrastructure widened the economic dimension o f the relationship. Between 1976 and
1980, Saudi exports to the US would spike from $1.9-12.9 billion dollars (1976, 162).
The stage was set for an era in which the complicated relationship o f these two countries
would deepen financially. This period, as mentioned above, also deepened their
geostrategic relationship..

Military and Strategic Development
On the military front, the Saudis became more involved in covert actions within
their region on behalf of US interests, much to the potential dismay of both Arab and
W estern publics (Coll, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). With growing unrest in the region, the US
became a more integral strategic partner for the Saudis, while simultaneously creating
new opportunities for US influence within the region.
The US was dealing with a new global enemy: terrorism aimed at its foreign
interests. In Saudi Arabia, a number of armed uprisings, bombings, and a general trend of
internal resistance continued to threaten both US and Saudi targets (Coll, 2004). These
threats existed outside of the Saudi borders as well. In 1970, the Palestine Liberation
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Organization (PLO) hijacked over 300 passengers aboard civilian airliners in Amman,
Jordan. Captivating the global media, these terrorists held the hostages for a week, and
then released them, shortly thereafter blowing-up the aircraft for the world to see
(Landlau & Landlau, 2002). Two years later, Islamic terrorist groups made an even
higher-profile hijacking at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, when members of the
Black September group held a team of Israeli athletes hostage and later murdered them
(Landlau & Landlau, 2002). Over the decade, these events would become foreground for
a larger trend o f kidnappings, assassinations, embassy bombings, and hijackings that
forced the US to create new strategies for defending against this threat (Baer, 2002; Crile,
2003).
W ithout surprise, during the coming decades the primary constraint on US-Saudi
relations would be a concern over US involvement with an increasingly unstable and
unpredictable region -one that, in the context o f global media, had become the face
associated with world terrorist organizations. The numerous future conflicts surrounding
US-Saudi relations would stem from this general principle.
During the 1970s however, the culmination of America’s growing dependence on
Saudi oil and the rapid rise of hostile acts from Islamic terrorist groups gave both the
public and its policy-makers much to fret over. By this time, Saudi Arabia, as one o f the
U S’s primary regional energy suppliers, could be undercut by Islamic radicals who
threatened the internal-stability of oil-producing countries. Groups like the Islamic Jihad,
Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Palestinian Liberation Organization, and others would
launch sporadic attacks on US targets (Baer, 2002; 2003; Crile, 2003; Landlau &
Landlau, 2002). This development, along with the looming Cold W ar with the Soviets,
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led many in the US policy-making community to believe that the only solution to
growing regional threats was a strengthened military presence in the Middle East, Saudi
Arabia in particular (Clarke, 2004, 37-39; Crile, 2003).
The US military took several measures to address the problem. Aside from
deepening its clandestine operations with Saudi Arabia, it began re-engineering many of
its operational capabilities. For example, the Pentagon greatly expanded the scope of its
Special Operations (SPECOPS) capabilities to include new units in each branch of the
military to counter the loosely-organized non-conventional armies o f terrorist
organizations (Landlau & Landlau, 2002). The N avy’s Special Warfare Command, for
example, created a Sixth SEAL team in part to respond to globally-diffused terrorist
organizations, and the ultra-secret DELTA team, about which little is found in the
mainstream media, was created with a similar design: operational versatility, global
deployability, and highly-specialized personnel with distinguished combat experience
(2002, 167, 276). Although the emergence of SEAL teams originated in their historical
maturation from W W II navy “Frogmen” into remarkably effective hit-and-run operatives
in the Vietnam conflict, these formerly underwater demolition crews developed startling
new capabilities in their adaptations to the unconventional behaviors of terrorist groups
(2002). Yet while the military was addressing strategic threats, other efforts were
underway to get better grasp of the religious sources of fundamentalist terror
organizations.
The rise of Islamic fundamentalism had strong implications for US-Saudi
diplomatic relations. The Saudi government was the secular component of a larger
regime which included the W ahhabi version of Islam as its religious foundation, a rigid
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interpretation of the Islamic religion that undergirded the nation’s founding in much the
same way that democratic thinking pervaded the founding of the US and creation of its
constitution (Schwartz, 2003). The two are permanent partners. In fact, at the Saudi
nation’s founding, the families of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab and A1 Sa’ud made several actions
to establish the Wahhabi family as the religious authority of the state, while the family of
A1 Sa’ud would carry the state’s political rule (Schwartz, 2003, 82; Unger, 2004). They
consecrated this agreement by inter-marrying the two families and thus establishing a
theocratic monarchy whereby the church and state would become one in the same
(Schwartz, 2003, 82). By permanently establishing Wahhabi Islam as its national creed,
the Saudi government eventually faced decades of overt resistance and challenges from
other sectors of the Arab and Islamic world who strongly detested the Wahhabi religion
(Schwartz, 2003). The country’s domestic stability as well as its perceived legitimacy
among other Arab populations would continue to balance on this controversial theology.
The Wahhabi strand of Islam, to which Osama bin Laden subscribes, has been
described as rigid and extreme (Rashid, 2003). The clan gained its early influence largely
through violence and cruelty to other more moderate Islamic sects and also with the help
of British aide (Klieman, 1970). During their expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries, the
W ahhabis embarked on a bloody campaign to rid the region of other tribes. In 1802, for
example, the Wahhabis surrounded the westem-Arabian city of T a’if, and despite the
city’s surrender, commenced with killing every man, woman, and child in the city, and
further desecrating its Mosques, until the inhabitants were exterminated (Schwartz,
2003).
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This type of cruelty gained the Wahhabis much hatred in the Arab world,
primarily because of its religious motivation, exemplified in the clan’s frequent
destruction and desecration of sacred grounds like the tombs of the Prophet M uhamm ad’s
wives and other family members (Schwartz, 2003). These and many other departures
from traditional Islam have made the Wahhabi clan highly controversial in the Muslim
world. Osama bin Laden, for example, was a major outspoken critic of the Saudi regime
before his exile (Schwartz, 2004; Clarke, 2004). Angered at a range of issues including
both US support for Israel, and the more recent presence of ‘infidel’ troops in Saudi holy
land —Muslim holy cites in particular, bin Laden’s revolutionary development in many
ways rooted itself in these two issues (Schwartz, 2004; Clarke, 2004). Together with his
growing appeal during this time period, bin Laden was emblematic of a fringe sentiment
in the Arab world; indeed, he is still celebrated among many Muslims (Schwartz, 2004;
Coll, 2004).
In recent times, this controversial sentiment appears in hostility toward the Saudi
regime, which has led many experts to question its long-term legitimacy and stability
(Baer, 2003; Unger, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). In terms of its military alliance, US-Saudi
concerns over the tandem rise of fundamentalism and terrorism brought a difficult
question to the forefront of US policy concerns: how to improve relations between the
two countries despite growing anti-westernism in both Saudi Arabia and the greater Arab
region.
Following the rapid growth the Kingdom experienced with US development
efforts, from the Saudis grew an increasing concern for internal and regional security
(Perkins, 2004, 87-88; Coll, 2004). With its Arab and Muslim neighbors beginning to
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resent its friendly relationship with the West, Israel beginning to envy its tremendous
growth, and the Soviets expanding into Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia sought additional
military support and training from the US to help solidify its regional position (2004, 8788; Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). To protect against both internal and external threats, the
Saudis relied upon the US for specialized weapons, facilities, training, and intelligence to
modernize its military strength (2004, 87-88; Clarke, 2004; Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004; Crile,
2003). So, in the same fashion as the US physically reshaped the Saudi Kingdom with
rapid infrastructure development, the US simultaneously revolutionized the Saudi
military.
To summarize, the 1970s showed a continuation of the economic and military
arrangements that preceded the decade’s major events. However, as a result of several
key developments, the US greatly expanded both its financial and strategic arrangements
with Saudi Arabia, which entailed the U S’s rapid modernization of the Saudi economy,
military, and state infrastructure to the benefit of greater regional influence and a more
secure Saudi state. In turn, both of these achievements would enhance the U S’s position
considerably in the coming decade, when the 80’s presented yet another set o f unique
global developments.

1980s: The Cold War, pow er balancing, and clandestine surrogacy
As the economic interests o f the US and the Saudi Kingdom continued to progress
the 1980s showed more sensitive and clandestine military cooperation between the two
countries. The Iran-Iraq war and the bold Soviet attack on Afghanistan provided
opportunities for the Saudis to play a key role in politically sensitive US military
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operations throughout the Middle-East and Central Asia. The scope of bi-lateral military
cooperation expanded through increases in covert actions against a number o f regional
dictators, terrorist groups, and the Soviet Union. Discussed below, several key
developments in world politics provided both the context and the motivation for
expanding the scope of US-Saudi relations to combat or otherwise undermine the Soviet
U nion’s expansion into Afghanistan and also to influence an increasingly volatile conflict
in Iran and Iraq (Unger, 2004, 57; Clarke, 2004, 42, 50). In a key communicative
development, the sensitive nature of this deepened military cooperation also brought a
more plausible need for secrecy in the relationship.
The Iran-Iraq war escalated by the early 1980s, and left the US in a precarious
position. Both Iran and Iraq posed significant threats to Israel and Saudi Arabia, which
were the U S’s two primary regional interests. The threat to Israel became a sensitive
political issue on the domestic front in the US (Crile, 2004). Upon entering office on the
tails of a landslide presidential victory, the Reagan-Bush administration had publicly
maintained a hard line against Islamic Fundamentalists, a position that seemed to bolster
support for Israel (Unger, 2004, 62-63; Crile, 2004). In terms of its threat to the region,
Iran was considered at the time to pose a potentially hostile threat to Saudi Arabia as well
(Quandt, 1981). Because Iran could harm both Israeli security and the U S’s oil supply
via Saudi Arabia, the country arguably posed an imminent threat to vital US interests.
But Iran was only one side of the coin. Iraq also posed an arguable threat to US interests.
Comparably speaking, the both became risks to regional security. (Unger, 2004; Coll,
2004; Crile, 2003; Hillsman, 1992; Coll, 2004)
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This ambiguous comparison left policy makers in a difficult position. For this and
probably numerous other reasons, the Reagan administration was fiercely divided over
the Iran-Iraq war, particularly over the question of covert support: who would receive it,
Iran or Iraq (Unger, 2004, 62)? On the one hand, Saddam Hussein was a brutal secular
dictator who posed an arguable threat to the region and Israel in particular, but if armed,
could threaten harm to Iran and thus defend US interests in Saudi Arabia as a third-party
covert actor (2004, 62; Hilsman, 1992). On the other hand, some in the Reagan White
House argued that Ayatollah Komeini’s fundamentalist regime in Iran publicly abhorred
and threatened to destroy the US, but, if armed could undermine Hussein’s ability to
strike Israel or do other damage within the region (2004, p. 62). In one o f its most
controversial decisions of the era, the US decided to secretly arm both Iran and Iraq
(2004, p. 62-63). It should be noted that despite accounts of mutual support, one regional
expert directly involved in the affair through his work with the CIA, Robert Baer,
strongly dismisses this claim, explaining it as a “vintage conspiracy theory that dogged
everything [CIA] tried in Iraq - the myth that the US secretly kept Saddam in power”
(See: 2002, 178).
In 1984, the US allegedly supported Saddam in his war against Iran through
intelligence sharing and weapons sales (Clarke, 2004, 42, 282). In doing so, however, the
US enlisted the help of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both of whom apparently acted as a third
party channels for the operation (2004, 282). According to Craig Unger (2004), the US
funneled billions in aid and weapons to Hussein’s regime, and decided to rely on third
party actors to avoid the widespread public condemnation that would have accompanied
news of this action (59-65). For similar reasons, the operation with Iran was equally
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discrete (2004). Initially, the US armed these countries secretly with the help of outside
parties like Israel, which funneled billions in arms, ammunition, and other equipment to
Iran in the early 80s (2004, 63). But after this operation came to light, the US allegedly
sought another third-party to facilitate ongoing deals of this nature, and that third-party
was Saudi-Arabia (2004, 62-63). But in asking Saudi-Arabia to help with this covert
arms supplying, the US also needed the Saudis’ assistance with another, seemingly
unrelated item: Nicaragua.
At the time, Nicaragua had been defending itself against a group of right-wing
rebels known as the contras and had become a hot topic for the administration. In fact,
responding to ongoing debate on the subject, the US Congress in 1982 voted
unanimously (411 to 0) against providing any US support for the contra rebels and the
overthrow of the Nicaraguan government in what was called the Boland Amendment
(Unger, 2004, 63, 65). During the course of events later called the Iran-Contra affair, and
flagrantly in the face of numerous decisions, public statements, and laws dictating the
contrary, the US used Prince Bandar and other Saudi intelligence officials as conduits for
indirect funding of Iraq, Iran, and the anti-leftist Contra rebels of Nicaragua (2004, 62-64;
Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). In doing so, the Saudis gained both initially, with a White
House-approved secret delivery of 400 Stinger missiles to the Saudi government, and
later on through greatly improved relations with the US (2004, 65).
By the mid 1980s the Saudis had become a key partner in the U S’s Middle East
operations and stood to both gain and suffer from it. From the American perspective, one
could argue that its controversial power-balance proved remarkably successful. Playing
two enemies against each other allowed the US to leverage considerable force in the
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region. Some have also speculated that the US benefited economically from the decision.
According to one economist, escalating war between these two key oil producers drove
down the price of Arab oil during the period (Quandt, 1988, 46). Beyond this speculative
account, the Iran-Iraq dilemma was only one facet o f the U S’s position in the region.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan posed an imminent threat to US interests in
the region. Although somewhat distant to the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan’s position was
close enough to US oil interests that the US intelligence community worried about the
Soviets projecting power into the region from Afghanistan in the same manner they
influenced Central Europe through the former Eastern Block (Coll, 2004, 42-43; Crile,
2003). The event also heightened Arab fears of Soviet expansion, and also reinforced the
value of US military support (2004; 2003). Shortly after the Afghan incursion, President
Carter established what historians call the “Carter doctrine” whereby he agreed to defend
Saudi Arabia and neighboring United Arab Emirates against foreign attack (Hilsman,
1992, 29; Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). This effort would eventually entail closer cooperation
including intelligence sharing, clandestine operational support, and funding with both
Saudi and Pakistani agencies (Coll, 2004, 44-45; Crile, 2003). By partnering with the
US in its fight against the “Evil Em pire’s” Central-Eurasian expansion, the Saudis
offered the US a rare and invaluable strategic partnership becoming a key staging point in
the clandestine proxy-war (Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). There was only one problem; the
presence of western troops on the soil that surrounds holy cites like Mecca and Medina
was highly controversial for Muslims because it violates scripture (Schwartz, 2003; Coll,
2004). Hence, the US hand in Afghanistan was a very sensitive issue for a number of
reasons, religious and strategic topping the list; for this reason, it remained invisible
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(Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). Here is where one sees the developing need for secrecy in the
relationship. Because of the sensitive nature of US-Saudi involvement, it seemed more
plausible that withholding information about the true on-goings of the relationship made
sense for reasons of national security.
During the Afghan wars, the US also asked Arab states like Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
and Pakistan to help recruit an Arab army to support Afghanistan’s fight against the
Soviets (Clarke, 2004, 52; Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). The Saudis led this effort in
assembling volunteers, and in doing so selected Osama bin Laden, son o f the billionaire
Saudi construction family, the Bin Ladens - a family who was and is very close to the
royal family (Unger, 2004, 52; Coll, 2004). Bin Laden’s key directive was to recruit,
transport, arm, train, and indoctrinate Arab volunteers and send them to train and fight in
Afghanistan (2004, 52; Coll, 2004). This effort proved a remarkably effective, as many
young Muslims eagerly joined to defend the Arab world against this atheist threat of
communism.
The U S’s primary goal in this effort was to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan
(Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). However, fearing high-scale retaliation from the Soviets, the
US maintained only an invisible hand in the conflict, a principle that necessitated the use
of Pakistani soil as an operational staging point (2004,44-45; Crile, 2003). In a dramatic
display of US support for the Mujahideen, Texas Congressman Charlie W ilson donated a
pint of his own blood during a visit to an afghan refugee camp in Pakistan (2003, 191).
The support was not merely symbolic. During the period, the US constructed several
bases for stockpiling weapons and supplies, and also funneled third-party funding to the
Afghan fighters through various Saudi and Pakistani charities and religious organizations
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(Clarke, 2004, 50; Coll, 2004; Crile, 2003). Illustrating the level of financial support
from Washington, by 1987, funding for the anti-Soviet covert action program had jum ped
from $35 million in 1982 to $600 million (Clarke, 2004, 50). As the Soviet Union fell,
many considered this funding well-justified, as many of the battles against the Soviets
were fought through well-funded non-conventional proxy wars within Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, South America, and elsewhere.
To summarize, the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, and even Nicaragua all
illustrated the growth in US-Saudi strategic cooperation. From an overview o f this
period, one sees how the Saudis were becoming a versatile partner in the U S’s
clandestine operations in the Middle-East and Central Asia. These efforts also supported
the economic interests of the relationship insofar as military support facilitated a more
secure and stable supply of oil. Because of the discrete and clandestine nature of these
operations, the relationship necessitated an even greater need for secrecy. In the end,
however, the 1980s again paved the way for greater mutual dependence between the two
countries both economically and militarily.

1990s: Iraq, Osama bin Laden, and Growing Anti-Western Sentiment
The central event that shaped the US-Saudi relationship in the 1990s was the U S’s
incursion into Iraq on behalf of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This event not only evinced a
situation in which the US was willing to commit troops to a hostile region to defend its
regional interests on behalf of the Saudis, the war also created circumstances in which
Saudi Arabia conceded to allow a permanent presence of US troops in Mecca and
Medina. Discussed below, these two outcomes of the Iraq war were the most defining
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because of their timely coincidence with the rise of Muslim terrorism, Arab Antiwesternism, and the growing threat of Osama bin Laden.
As the 1990s began, a US invasion of Iraq loomed in the minds of policy makers.
Although a number of international scholars and political scientists have examined the
various causes and outcomes of the Gulf W ar (Baram & Rubin, 1993; Pelletiere, 2001;
Salinger, 1991; Yetiv, 1997; Smith, 1992; Wilson, 2005), this chapter’s analysis of the
conflict will focus on the war’s impact on the US-Saudi partnership. The US incursion
into Iraq on behalf of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had key implications on its relations with
the Saudis (Wilson, 2005). Leading to a permanent presence o f US troops in the
Kingdom, the first Gulf W ar enhanced 1) the strategic importance of Saudi soil, 2) the
US military presence in the region, and 3) growing uneasiness and domestic unrest within
the Arab world and inside Saudi Arabia over US military presence in Muslim Holy land.
The war escalated after several diplomatic moves by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. In
1990, following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam made several requests of his
neighbors, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to help him recover from
the costly war (Hilsman, 1992, 41-42). Reasoning that he was defending the entire gulf
region against an imminent Iranian threat, he made several requests to help balance out
the costs of post-war reconstruction:
-Forgive all outstanding debt, and offer $30 billion in new loans
-Kuwait, which allegedly stole Iraqi Oil, must pay $2.4 billion
-Emirates must stop violating strict OPEC quotas for oil output
-OPEC must raise the price of oil (1992, 41-42)
The Saudis, along with their neighbors, refused these requests (1992, 42). This was one
of many circumstances that eventually instigated Saddam’s increasingly aggressive
behavior within the region. Saddam threatened attacks on both Saudi Arabia and Israel -
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the U S’s two main regional interests; the US responded that it would react “vigorously”
in such a case (1992, 76). Fearing estimates that damaged Saudi oil fields could spike
domestic oil prices from under $20 dollars to nearly $70 a barrel, the US had an
imperative to protect Saudi oil fields from Iraqi bombings (1992, 59). As war became an
imminent threat, King Fahd granted US permission to station over 425,000 troops in
Saudi Arabia; shortly thereafter Bush sent ground, naval, and air units to the region
(1992, 1, 96). In the end, Saddam attacked his neighbor, Kuwait, which allegedly was
diagonally-drilling for oil under Iraqi soil (1992,42). Soon thereafter, the US declared
war against Saddam after his refusal to leave Kuwait.
At the outset of the invasion, President Bush outlined his 3 primary goals of the
Iraqi incursion: first, defend Saudi Arabia; second, force Iraq out of Kuwait; and third,
send a punitive message to Saddam (Hilsman, 1992, 71). The Saudis, however, remained
concerned over the presence of US troops on Saudi soil, which violated Islamic principles
(Clarke, 2004, 59). American B-52s were staging bomb runs on Arab (Iraqi) targets
from Saudi soil, which was a lasting thorn for many Muslims who hold religious
sentiment for Iraq despite its ruler and equally oppose the presence of western troops near
M ecca and Medina (Hilsman, 1992, 115; Schwartz, 2003). Iran’s religious leaders urged
Muslims to oppose the US troop presence in Saudi Arabia (Hilsman, 1992, 74). That
same year, Yemen’s President criticized Saudi Arabia for bringing US troops to the
region (Hilsman, 1992, 86). Aside from religious concerns, Saudis in particular were
worried about collateral damage from Saddam’s attacks. Iraqi Scuds struck targets in
Dahram, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 Americans, and wounding over 100 (Hilsman, 1992,
127). A large number of Scuds were also fired into Riyadh (1992, 97). Beyond
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resentment of US military presence and the fears about collateral damage, the failing state
of Iraq was another major issue in the region.
By the w ar’s end, Saddam was left without a formidable army, and the US came
out victorious. But the post-war scenario was a new concern for policy makers. US
Secretary of State James Baker introduced a 5-point plan to guide the post-war Iraq,
which included two items of great significance to Saudi Arabia and its neighbors. One
major point in the Baker plan asserted the need for a permanent US military presence in
the region, presumably on Saudi soil (Hilsman, 1992, 117). Secondly, the plan also
called for a significant reduction of US dependence on Middle-Eastern oil, a large
measure of which was currently supplied by the Saudis (1992, 117). W ith the Saudis
becoming increasingly crucial to the U S’s strategic position in a volatile region, the
1990s would demonstrate a rising rate of Arab disapproval of the US presence in the
Saudi Kingdom, and of the relationship in general (Clarke, 2004, 62; Schwartz, 2003). In
1991, as post-war peace plans developed, the many Saudi leaders expressed disagreement
with a permanent US military presence in the region, for which US negotiators in turn
continued to press (Hilsman, 1992, 93).
There was, however, another lasting implication of the Iraq war on US-Saudi
relations. By holding back on Saddam, the US let him gain strength, which also seemed
to necessitate an extended US military presence in Saudi-Arabia to prevent another attack
against Kuwait (Clarke, 2004, 66). To protect against future attacks from Saddam, the
Saudis pressed President Bush to begin a significant clandestine military effort to divide
and undermine Saddam’s military, in 1992; Bush agreed (Hilsman, 1992, p. 248).
However, the domestic and regional unrest was becoming a serious problem and quickly
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became visible through a series of terrorist attacks aimed at US interests and allies within
the region. In the early 1990’s terrorists supported by Iran targeted US interests in Saudi
Arabia. First, in 1995, it bombed a Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh; the second
major target was a tower of military barracks in Khobar, which brought the total of US
lives lost to 24 in two major attacks (Baer, 2002, 250).
Dealing with the broad problems associated with these types of carefully-planned
attacks is difficult for the Saudis even today. According to some analysts, the U S’s
desires for the region were met with uncooperative efforts to capture terrorists within
Saudi Arabia. As outlined by several regional experts (Baer, 2003, 2004; Clarke, 2004;
Schwartz, 2003; Coll, 2004), the Saudi royal leadership is greatly divided Over its
relationship with the West, which undermines any collective attempts at broad reform
within the Saudi regime. This may explain why, to the dismay of US officials, the Saudis
were uncooperative when the US sought their help in detaining Hizballah terrorist leader
Imad Mugmiyah who was flying into a Saudi Airport in 1997 (Clarke, 2004, 153). Many
similar examples abound in this period (Baer, 2003; Clarke, 2004), but the internal
division within the Saudi royal family did little to prevent its partnership with the US.
To summarize, the Iraq war brought the US-Saudi alliance to a new level of
strategic and political involvement. By providing the impetus for both the temporary and
permanent presence of US troops on Muslim holy land, the Iraq war deepened the level
of bi-lateral military cooperation beyond any previous decade. Unfortunately for both
parties, this cooperation would enflame growing Arab hatred of the west which would
eventually hurt the US just one year after the decade’s end.
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Pre-Sept. 11: Terrorism and the H unt fo r Bin Laden
During the months leading up to Sept. 11, 2001, the U S’s fight against a growing
international terrorist threat became the leading focus between the two countries.
Discussed below, Saudi Arabia’s record in the fight against terror was mixed. Although
they appeared to cooperate publicly with the U S’s efforts to stop the spread of terrorist
organizations within its borders, much evidence suggested the contrary -th a t they quietly
resisted.
By the end of the 1990s senior US policy makers became increasingly fearful of a
widely growing trend of anti-western and anti-American sentiment in the Middle-East
(Baer, 2003; Clarke, 2004; Schwartz, 2003; Coll, 2004). Noticing a growing number of
terrorist attacks on foreign US targets and interests, the Pentagon and the US intelligence
community increased their efforts at capturing or otherwise stopping the growth of this
movement (Clarke, 2004; Baer, 2002; Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004). In doing so, the US
depended upon a wide range of clandestine, diplomatic, and intelligence-sharing projects
with key partners in the Middle-East like Saudi Arabia (Coll, 2004). In terms of its
support and cooperation for these activities, the Saudis played a rather ambiguous role in
the war on terror, and the hunt for bin Laden in particular.
On the one hand, many have argued that the Saudis played a crucial role in
fighting terrorism in the Middle East. President Bush, for example, has frequently
applauded the Saudis for condemning terrorism (April 25, 2002; April 25, 2005), and a
several historians and international scholars have highlighted the Saudi’s exiling of
Osama bin Laden and its subsequent attempts to subdue al Qaeda attacks within the Saudi
Kingdom as evidence of its support (Coll, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). The Saudi government
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appeared more motivated to capture bin Laden and other terrorists After the Mecca
Affair, when the Muslim Brotherhood (with which Osama was closely affiliated) seized
the Grand Mosque in 1979 (Unger, 2004).
At the same time, however, the Bin Laden family’s close connections with the
Saudi government, according to one account, made it “ impossible to take strong punitive
action against him” (Unger, 2004, 96). After all, the bin Laden construction firm was the
official custodian and engineer of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina; ironically, the bin
Laden company was rebuilding the Grand Mosque when it was attacked (2004, 95). So
while the Saudis desperately wished to rid themselves of Osama bin Laden and the
Muslim Brotherhood, it walked a very delicate line in actually capturing and punishing
them. This tendency, according to some accounts, lead to half-hearted efforts in Saudi
cooperation with the US in the war on terror (Baer, 2003; Clarke, 2004).
According to the FBI’s former counter-terrorism Chief, Richard Clarke (2004),
Saudi cooperation in the war on terror could be described as lethargic, reluctant, and in
some cases resistant (281). According to Clarke, the US gave Saudis intelligence in three
areas of concern, to which it received little if any feedback or response:
1) al Qaeda operatives living and operating within Saudi Arabia
2) al Qaeda fundraising and money-laundering in the kingdom
3) The use of Saudi charities to support al Qaeda activities (Clarke, 2004, 281)
Apparently, only after a 2003 al Qaeda truck bombing in Riyadh did the Saudis show any
considerable effort in providing information to US intelligence agencies (2004, 281). A
similar example occurred just before the September 11th attacks when former MiddleEast CIA Officer Robert Baer obtained a list o f hundreds of bin Laden operatives who
were working secretly in the Gulf Region, including Saudi Arabia (Baer, 2002, 270-271).
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After he presented the information to the Saudi Government, they refused to
acknowledge it, or distribute the information to other Saudi officials and intelligence
agencies (2002, 271). But while the Saudis appeared unhelpful in capturing and
investigating terror cells within its borders, they played a key role in pressuring the
Taliban, rulers of Afghanistan, to give up Osama Bin Laden.
In 2000, for example, the US was trying to get the Taliban to force the closure of
al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan (Clarke, 2004, p. 207). The US had “no
leverage” in negotiating with the Taliban, and perhaps was additionally reluctant to
arrange formal diplomatic channels with an essentially rogue theocratic government,
which led Washington to seek several third parties to step-in and appeal to the Taliban on
its behalf (2004, 208). With the exception of Pakistan, the Saudis were the only major
regional state that recognized the Taliban as the official governors of Afghanistan
(Woodward, 2002, 87). Along with Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia
was a key US surrogate in these negotiations (Clarke, 2004, 208).
Despite an offer of considerable foreign aid, the Saudis pleas for Taliban
cooperation in removing Bin Laden were rejected (Clarke, 2004, 208). The Saudis did
end formal diplomatic relations with the Taliban, but continued to send diplomats in an
attempt to “reason” with the Taliban, whereby Saudi Intelligence Minister Prince Turki
offered an even larger sum of foreign aid in exchange for Bin Laden’s extradition; again
the offer was refused (2004, 208). Yet while these efforts were unsuccessful, proponents
may value the utility of having the Saudis negotiating on America’s behalf.
To summarize, the level o f Saudi cooperation in the war on terror was very
ambiguous in the Pre-Sept. 11 period. W hile it appeared the Saudis were selective in
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their support for US anti-terror efforts, incongruous accounts (see Unger, 2004; Clarke,
2004; Baer, 2003; Coll, 2004) shows the generally foggy nature of their internal and
regional security dilemmas, which cannot receive adequate development here. It is clear
that the Saudis publicly supported the effort, however, the extent of this cooperation is
unclear.

Post-Sept. 11: Expatriation, Osama bin Laden, Public Criticism, and the War on Terror
The Post-Sept. 11 period showed the most adverse and conflicted state of USSaudi Affairs. As discussed below, the 9-11 attacks rapidly changed the public’s
perception of the Saudis because of their association with the attackers. This factor
heightened the level of scrutiny on Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with US anti-terror
efforts, which pushed this issue to the fore of the relationship.
The 9-11 attacks were a turning point in the American public’s perception of the
Saudis and the US-Saudi partnership in particular. Aside from an Egyptian, a Lebanese,
and a man from the United Arab Emirates, the remaining 15 of the 19 alleged hijackers
were Saudi Arabian nationals (Coll, 2004). In addition, their suspected leader, Osama
Bin Laden, was a Saudi national living off the wealth endowed by the bin Laden family
who maintained close relationships with the Saudi Royal family (Unger, 2004). In light
of these facts, Americans were stunned when they learned of a massive expatriation of
Saudi royal family members and members of the Bin Laden family that occurred with the
blessing of the US government during the hours following the terrorist attacks (Baer,
2003; Clarke, 2004; Posner, 2005). In the wake of the September 11th attacks, the US
government allegedly sanctioned the immediate departure of numerous members of the
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Saudi Royal family and the Bin Laden family, assumedly for fear of hostilities that might
emerge against Muslim and Arab Americans (Clarke, 2004; Posner, 2005).
This has been a very controversial topic, and Administration officials have denied
the incident even occurred; the official report from the 9-11 commission also fails to
address the veracity of this story, which creates considerable ambiguity from a historian’s
perspective. Nonetheless, speculation about the event’s occurrence invited a heightened
level of public criticism and attention to the US-Saudi relationship, in particular, the ties
between the Bush Family and the House of Saud. These events created a new set of
questions about the relationship and, when combined with frequent escalations in the
Middle-East, brought tremendous pressure on the W hite House (Fleischer, 2005).
Despite these developments, the US continued its sensitive relationship with the
Saudis and commenced an extended round of diplomacy in the Middle East to lay the
foundations for the U S’s imminent war against terror. In October 2001, after instructing
the National Security Council to withhold any information about the trip or its purposes,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld left on a multi-nation tour of the Middle-East that
included a stop in Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 2002, 187). When he returned, Rumsfeld
reported that the Saudis were in need of regular high-level diplomatic attention; while
they were gracious, warm, and complimentary, the royal family remained worried that
the US was “unhappy” (2002, 203). It is unclear from W oodward’s account whether the
Saudis were referring to the W hite House specifically, or to the tenor of US public
opinion. A month later, General Tommy Franks reported to senior officials of a similar
six-country tour, which included Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 2002, 289). He was
surprised at the warm reception he received; he related the Saudis’ understanding that the
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war on terror could be long, and that the highest Saudi officials pledged their cooperation
in the war, despite “resistance” and “friction” in the lower levels of the Saudi government
(2002, p. 289). This lower-level heel-dragging may have reflected a division among
Saudi leadership over the issue of cooperation with the West.
Shortly following this trip, on November 9, President Bush met with Saudi
foreign minister Prince Saud to forge a stronger sense of cooperation (Woodward, 2002,
302). At the meeting the Prince agreed that solidarity would help rid Afghanistan of al
Qaeda, after which Bush made the observation that Osama “hates you more than me”
(2002, 302). To which the Prince replied that, “it’s an honor to be hated by someone like
him” (2002, 302). Nonetheless, he assured Bush that the House of Saud would not cut its
oil production to the US, which was then supplying roughly 8% of the U S’s daily
consumption (2002, 302).
Before the U S’s invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Administration publicly
acknowledged a growing list of rationales for invading. Although it consistently voiced
these concerns publicly, unmentioned was a concern over growing tensions in US-Saudi
relations (Clarke, 2004, 265). The first of these, which Vice President Cheney, Deputy
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld all acknowledged,
was a growing threat of instability in the Saudi regime, which stemmed from the
extended presence of US troops in the country - a lasting “source of anti-Americanism
threatening the ... regime” (2004, 265). The Saudis had experienced internal dissent and
Uprisings for years, but the pattern was growing after US troops remained (Coll, 2004).
US policy makers began to consider the underlying factors of Saudi instability.
Border security was among these concerns. In 2002, for example, US analysts were
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concerned about the Saudi’s ability to control its expansive unprotected 700-mile border
with Yemen, a suspected crossover point for arms trafficking and terrorist groups like al
Qaeda and others (Woodward, 2002, 327; Coll, 2004, 537). This concern peaked after
the bombing of the USS Cole in a Yemeni port in October of 2000 (Coll, 2004, 537).
The event signaled a lapse in the U S’s intelligence and military influence in the area
(2004, 537). Analysts also became concerned about the pervasive presence of moles
within the Saudi government.
Much earlier, the Saudis suspected many moles had infiltrated its military and
security forces, which in the words of former FBI counter-terrorist head Richard Clarke,
were “riddled with termites” (Clarke, 2004, 282). Another worrisome development was
the growing Arab resentment of Saudi-US relations, which along with an increasing antiJewish and anti-western sentiment, became an typical theme of anti-American teachings
in Mosques and religious schools (2004, 282). Evincing the heated threats from the
Kingdom’s militants bent on overthrowing the Saudi regime, Saudi forces were
frequently engaging in gun battles and street fighting with armed insurgents. The Saudis
discovered a large arms cache intended to supply guerilla warfare efforts against US and
Saudi facilities (2004, 282). In sum, the picture of Saudi stability was fading; B aer’s
(2003) account o f these developments also suggests systemic lapses in the regime’s
security that may have long-term consequences for its longevity.
Adding to these internal security issues, however, were more deeply seeded
cultural factors. A US general admitted that rising ethnic and extremist tensions in Saudi
Arabia constituted an unconventional “battle of ideas” that, compared with a military
incursion, was more difficult to surmount (Clarke, 2004, 263). Saudi Arabia ranked 3rd
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on a list of three nations prioritized by their importance to US interests, and by the
likelihood that they will fall to al Qaeda insurgents (Clarke, 2004, 281). Adding to
worries about Saudi vulnerability, the US received evidence that Saudi individuals and
charities provided funds and cover for al Qaeda operatives prior to the 9-11 attacks
(Clarke, 2004, 270). Clarke (2004) reported that, “Saudi government funds and those of
concerned wealthy Saudis flowed to a series of charities and nongovernmental
organizations, which in turn provided support for al Qaeda operatives” (282). It appeared
that despite US concerns over Saudi stability, the region seemed like a hot-bed for
security risks. Another factor adding to this issue was the relationship between Wahhabi
Islam and the Saudi Royal family.
Al Qaeda’s fundamentalist beliefs meshed closely with those of many Saudi
royals. The Saudis were influential in creating W ahhabist schools and mosques in key
jihadist countries, as well as in the US and Europe (Clarke, 2004, 282; Schwartz, 2004).
Although the US encouraged this activity in the region during the Afghan wars, now the
trend became a worry for policy makers -a n example of what intelligence insiders call
“blowback” (Coll, 2004; Baer, 2002). The W ahhabist reading of Islam instructed
followers to spread the worldwide influence of Islam, and to not tolerate other religions even alternative and moderate versions of Islam (Clarke, 281; Schwartz, 2004).
Moreover, as “keeper of the Two Holy Mosques,” Mecca and Medina, which remains the
official title of the Saudi King, the House o f Saud continued to derive its religious
authority as a “protector of Muslims everywhere,” and “supporter of Islam everywhere”
(Clarke, 2004, 281). The Saudi royal family, as directed by its own charter and more
informally by its Wahhabi culture, supported the spread of its religion across the globe
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(2004, 204). At the same time, its partnership with the west undermined many tenets of
Wahhabi Islam.
It appeared that the Saudi royals helped efforts to spread the global jihad and antiIsraeli activities in the Middle-East (2004, p. 282). It also seemed that the Saudis ignored
the anti-American teachings and indoctrination of intolerance toward the west that
pervaded the teachings in Wahhabi Mosques and Schools within the kingdom (2004, p.
282). By removing a western-styled curriculum, and replacing it with a Wahhabist
religious education, the Saudis took another step toward allowing western intolerance
(2004, p. 282). These cultural factors could not have boded any sense of promise or
stability. Policy makers may have prefigured these developments alongside an equally
bothersome picture of the Kingdom’s security issues.
To summarize, the Post-Sept. 11 period created circumstances in which two
issues became of paramount importance to both US and Saudi interests: public criticism
and the war on terror. Because of the dynamic change in the US perception of Saudi
Arabia in the aftermath of 9-11, Americans were increasingly skeptical of the
relationship. For this reason, the Saudis’ ability to appear cooperative in the war on
terror became a key priority. Here, the ambiguous level of real cooperation in this effort
became another key development within this period.

The Bush-Saudi Relationship
Within the larger context of US-Saudi relations is a smaller, more intimate
collection of relationships between the Bush family and the Saudi royal family.
Considering the longevity and historical impact George HW Bush and George W Bush

US-Saudi Diplomacy

60

have and continue to have on both the domestic and international landscape, their
ascendance to power in the past several decades warrants special consideration when
discussing the US-Saudi relationship. Although difficult to summarize, an overview of
this relationship is in order because of the central role these two families have come to
play in both US political circles and in the larger geo-political arena. In much the same
way that the US-Saudi relationship transformed in response to key developments in world
affairs, the Bush-Saudi partnership adapted to key political and industrial developments
following the oil embargo of 1973.
The financial and political connections that existed between the two families
seemed to have emerged in tandem. Moreover, as they provide background for the
rhetorical analysis of this study, these financial relationships explain yet another
dimension of the economic interests underlying the partnership. Although they exist
arguably in an un-official realm, they still relate to a study of ‘official rhetoric’ because
of their longevity over time, because of their significance within the relationship, and
because of they key role they play in constituting the rhetorical situation of the meeting
and speeches in Crawford in 2002. In part due to the magnitude o f financial co
investment between the families, and the materialization of the partnership in conjunction
with the Bush family’s rise to power, this familial relationship takes on unique
importance when considered on its own and even more so with an eye toward official
rhetoric. W hat follows is a surface-sketch of the dynamic political and financial ties that
emerged and matured from the 1970s onward. These political and financial ambitions
would help the Saudis gravitate into a strong personal alliance with the Bush family,
which remains today.
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The financial ties between the Bush and Saudi families began in the seventies.
According to published interviews with Time reporters, James Bath, a Houston attorney
connected to Texas oil and the Bush family commenced a series of plane sales to Saudi
royals and became the initial conduit for the Bush-Saudi relationship that followed
(Unger, 2004; Beaty and Gwynne, 1991). Based on an account given to the Houston
Chronicle (Unger, 2004, 33, 307; Urban, 1992), he also made a similar sale to Salem bin
Laden, founder of the multi-billion dollar Saudi construction firm BinLaden Corp., and
father of Osama Bin Laden; still later, he represented the bin Laden’s business interests in
America beginning in 1976 (2004, 33). Bath became a channel through which the Saudis
developed relationships with various Texas businesses and political figures during this
period, which included two future Presidents, a Secretary of State, and numerous other
political players. During this period, Houston became a bastion of Saudi oil profits.
According to one account, over 80 private Houston firms cemented “strong business
relationships” with various Saudi royals during this time (2004, p. 27). These
relationships included access to the Bush family, who had emerged as powers in both the
political and business sectors.
This trend of investment continued. From the 70s onward, wealthy Saudis began
a wave of investments in American markets, which was part of the Saudi reinvestment
strategy associated with JECOR, mentioned above. According to Unger (2004), “roughly
eighty-five thousand ‘high-net-worth’ Saudis invested a staggering $860 billion in
American companies -a n average of more than $10 million a person” (28). These
investments found their way into major banks, energy companies, defense firms,
technology businesses, and media conglomerates (2004, 28-29). Although the Saudis
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were clearly interested in profiting from healthy US markets, there was also a political
outcome attached to their bidding.
As Unger (2004) explained, these investments were characterized into two
general categories. On one hand, “there were blue chips such as Citigroup and AOL
Time Warner, and huge, secretive consortiums such as Investicorp, which put billions
into companies including Tiffany, Gucci, and Saks Fifth Avenue” (2004, 28). Balancing
these high-volume investments, however, was a second type of investment aimed at
fostering relationships with political elites. Unger describes these investments in the
following passage:
The House of Saud also made a handful of investments in troubled companies that
were loaded with debt and regulatory problems -w hich just happened to be owned
by men who had or might have White House ties. (2004, 28)
Here is an investment strategy aimed at fostering relationships that offered access to
power. In one example of this strategy, a Saudi investor influenced the rescue o f a
struggling Harken Energy Co. with a $24 million investment in 1987 when George W.
Bush was its director (2004, 200). It appears from this and other accounts (Baer, 2003),
that the Saudis sought to broaden their influence with American policy makers through
their financial strategies. If this was indeed their aim, they furnished it quite well by
drawing themselves closer to a family that would land itself in public offices from Texas
to Florida, and eventually three terms in the Oval Office.
The Bush-Saudi relationship demonstrated its fruitfulness when George H. W.
Bush rose to the Vice-Presidency in the Reagan administration. James Baker, then Chief
of Staff and close political and financial ally of George Bush, owned over 111,000 shares
of the Texas Commerce bank which was founded by his grandfather (Unger, 2004, 53).
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Simultaneously, Saudi broker Khalid bin Mahfouz teamed-up with Houston developer
Gerald Hines to finance the Texas Commerce Tower in Houston, which became home to
the Texas Commerce Bank (2004, 53). Amidst a wave of foreign investment in
American banks, the Saudis now planted a financial seed that gained them access to the
White House through Baker, and later through both George H. W. and George W. Bush.
At the center of this strategy, which Unger calls “access capitalism,” is a firm called the
Carlyle Group (2004).
The D.C.-based Carlyle Fund is a global private equity firm that currently
manages over $24.8 billion, primarily in the defense, aerospace, energy, industry,
commercial, and tech sectors (www.thecarlylegroup.com). The firm led what many
financial analysts have dubbed a ‘mega-fund’ trend, whereby private equity firms
strategically buy out and manage large conglomerates to make them more profitable. In
2005, private equity firms, including Carlyle, managed over 14% of all global corporate
mergers (Pearlstein, 2005, E-10). According to Washington Post financial writer Steven
Pearlstein, “Carlyle’s strategy has not only been to aim for bigger funds, but to build on
its original success with buyouts by offering a variety of other funds” (2005, E-10). The
firm deals with high-dollar, high volume buyouts; according to its investor relations
department, the firm requires a minimum investment of $5 million from individuals, and
$25 million from companies or investor groups just to become what it deems a “qualified
purchaser “ (www.thecarlvlegroup.com ). The scope and volume of the firm ’s
investments are both key factors in the firm ’s attractiveness to wealthy investors looking
to leverage large sums of money in the most influential global markets.
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Perhaps more attractive, especially in the case of the Saudis, is Carlyle’s centrality
to W ashington power brokers, the most prominent of whom line its roster of advisors,
consultants, investors, and managers. Among these are former Secretary of State James
Baker, former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci, former director of the Office of
Management and Budget, Richard Darman, former British Prime Minister John Major,
and former President George H. W. Bush.
The Saudis have actively invested in Carlyle funds in past decades. According to
U nger’s (2004) estimate, members of the Saudi Royal family and companies under their
control have invested over $1.2 Billion dollars in various Carlyle-owned corporations and
funds (296). Their returns have arisen both in numbers and in political access. Among
the roster of Carlyle advisors to visit the Saudis on behalf of the firm are George H. W.
Bush, James Baker, and John Major, all of whom are heavily invested in the firm (2004,
296).
These overlapping connections have been the source of much public controversy,
especially after September 11th, when Carlyle forced the withdrawal of significant funds
invested by the Saudi Bin Laden group in response to public criticism o f the firm
(Kopytoff, March, 2003). Also heightened have been criticisms of ‘war profiteering’
waged by war protesters like Jeff Grubler, who told the San Francisco Chronicle that
“the people who are going to benefit from [the Iraq] war are George Bush’s friends, his
dad and then himself, when he inherits the money” (Kopytoff, March, 2003). This tenor
of criticism stemmed in part from the firm ’s traditional focus on defense, aerospace, and
energy firms.
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More generally, though, the firm has allowed investors like the Saudis
unprecedented access both to major US policy makers and lucrative foreign investment
opportunities in the w orld’s largest markets. What Unger calls, ‘access capitalism’ is a
strategy to bring political, financial, and strategic interests to bear upon personal
relationships, like those between the Saudi royals and the Bush family (2004). But the
Saudi’s involvement with the Carlyle group indicates the financial element of a more
complex political partnership, much of which occurred through the political ascendance
of the Bush family.
In sum, the Saudis began gaining access to US power-brokers through George
H.W. Bush’s rise to the W hite House, as well as the emerging oil and energy markets that
originated in the Houston oil boom of the 70’s. W hat followed, however, was a period in
which the Saudis’ political bargaining power improved as the former President’s son
George W. Bush began his own rise to power from the Texas Governor’s office to the
Oval Office on Pennsylvania Avenue. It was then that the Saudis wielded the most
intimate and powerful influence with US policy makers in the W hite House.
The political and financial success of the Bushes was shared in tandem with the
Saudis. They had calculated and maneuvered in such a way as to position themselves as
long-time friends of the Bush family. In several sources (Bush, 2003; Unger, 2004;
Schwartz, 2003), stories of family visits and intimate get-togethers between Bush family
members and Saudi Royals like Ambassador Prince Bandar bin Sultan color the BushSaudi history as warm, familial, and genuine. The sense of familiarity and openness
seems to coincide with public accounts of their relationship, but it has also become the
target of major public criticisms alleging conflicts o f interest and undue influence on US
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policy. Evidence supporting these claims has become controversial in its own right, and
will not receive extensive treatment here. On the whole, however, the account o f the
financial and political ties between the families illustrates the depth and complexity of the
relationship. Although much of the relationship is hidden behind third parties,
ambiguous investor relations, official “deniability mechanisms” (Unger, 2004), and
issues surrounding national security, a surface sketch of the relationship reveals there is
much more to this relationship than meets the eye.
To summarize, the Bush-Saudi relationship is an important part of the US-Saudi
relationship because of the unusually close political and financial connections that exist
privately between the families. Through major investment initiatives, political accessgiving, and lasting mutual commitments in US foreign policy, this family allegiance is a
key development within the larger diplomatic relationship.

Key Dimensions: Complexity, Secrecy, and Multi-dimensionality
The Saudi role in US foreign policy is indeed a complicated and influential one.
As it prefaces the analysis chapter of this study, this overview of the US-Saudi
partnership comprises a crucial background for a study of official rhetoric. As Phillip
W ander (1984) put it, “a full understanding of the rhetoric of American foreign policy
must take into acco u n t... its relation to facts and events beyond the language employed,
matters on which the lives of tens of millions, if not the whole of humanity, now depend”
(340). From this chapter, we see three clear themes that characterize US-Saudi
diplomacy: a multi-dimensional collection of national interests, an underlying complexity
within each of those interests, and lastly, an inclination towards secrecy.
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In terms of the underlying interests of US-Saudi diplomacy, we see three distinct
but overlapping dimensions of the relationship: economics, security, and Israeli.
Economic interests constitute one key dimension of the partnership. As leading members
of OPEC, the chief supplier of “sweet” crude to the US, and major investors in US
markets, the Saudis are major players in the global economy, which as outlined above,
has predicated one major facet of the relationship. Secondly, the Saudis have continued
their deep involvement in US military operations in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Their involvement in clandestine operations as well as overt strategic cooperation and
intelligence sharing demonstrates the degree to which the Saudis help facilitate the U S’s
vital strategic interests in the region. Lastly, the Israeli-Palestinian issue has both
economic and cultural underpinnings. As outlined above, this conflict may not
necessarily predicate the relationship in the ways that oil and strategic interests do, but on
the other hand, the 1973 oil embargo demonstrates the sensitivity and importance of the
issue in the context of US-Saudi relations. In sum, we can conclude from the evidence
above that the relationship is built upon a multi-dimensional set of interests.
Within each of these interests, however, remains another layer of complexity.
The strategic interests of the relationship, for example, are complex and overlapping. We
see this complexity in the clandestine wars fought with Saudi assistance. Saudi support
was imperative to US military efforts in the Cold War, the Iran-Iraq war, G ulf Wars I and
I I , the hunt for Osama bin Laden, and has also become a major bargaining item in the
most recent US campaign against terrorism. The variety o f conflicts is compounded by
the two states’ interests in regional security. It is clear that both parties care a great deal
about defending Saudi soil, a concern that predicated the U S’s rapid development of the
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Saudi military and intelligence agencies (Quandt, 1981). But what muddles this picture
is the fact that each state has its own alliances, enemies, issues, and interests within the
region that cannot possibly maintain a consistent sense of congruence. Hence, any
attempt to simplify the nature of the U S’s strategic interest is difficult because of the
numerous factors that come to bear on this partnership.
This complexity is also seen in terms of economic interests. First, Saudi oil
output is a keystone of the U S’s energy policy. This fact alone makes the Saudis a
pinnacle consideration for US foreign policy makers. The Saudis also have an enormous
amount of capital invested in US markets and US firms, which adds another element to
the list of economic ties. Lastly, when we consider Unger’s (2004) argument about
access capitalism, it seems that the Saudis are also heavily invested in financing political
capital among key US political actors. Some may question Unger’s position, but one
cannot ignore the deftness with which the Saudis have gained entree with major political
figures along side their monumental investments. While Unger offers a rare account of
this growing political relationship, bolstered by corroborative testimony, interviews with
participants, and de-classified documents, one is still left with questions about the
motivations behind the Saudi-Bush strategy. Here again, it is difficult to simplify these
economic interests because of the copious causes and aspects that impact this dimension
of the relationship.
On the Palestinian-Israeli issue, it is perhaps even more difficult to simplify the
parties’ interests. On the American side, the issue weighs heavily on the minds of
politicians, especially during upcoming election years. On the other hand, the Saudis are
in a unique quandary on the issue because their proximity to it. The Israeli army is
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arguably one of the most well-equipped and advanced threats to the Saudi state. Aside
from this strategic point, there is also a deep religious and cultural sensitivity to the
conflict for all Arabs, especially those in Saudi Arabia (Schwartz, 2003). Deeper still, the
issue has powerful ramifications because of its significance to terrorist organizations who
cite US support for Israel as motivation for regional and global attacks on US interests
(2003). These are only a few of the ways the Israeli-Palestinian conflict impacts the
relationship, but they demonstrate again the composite nature of the US-Saudi interests.
W hile the relationship’s multi-dimensional and complex interests characterize its
history and guiding influences, its need for secrecy is also of key importance. Because so
many o f the relationship’s interests facilitate each party’s national security, it is easy to
understand the need for secrecy. It would have been unthinkable, for example, if the
public were made aware of the US-Saudi involvement in the Afghan wars. For the same
reasons that a military general will not announce his/her battle plans over CNN, many of
the factors involved in the relationship cannot emerge because they would seriously
jeopardize ongoing military efforts. If George W. Bush was correct when he said that, “a
strategy by some would be to split the United States and Saudi Arabia,” when suggesting
possible motives of the 9-11 hijackers, then we can understand that the relationship itself
can become a military target (Bush, April 25, 2002). It is partially because of the
relationship’s importance to vital US interests that it necessitates such a degree of secrecy
among public officials. This is an especially salient factor for the upcoming analysis
chapter for two reasons.
First, it justifies W ander’s (1984) argument that official foreign policy rhetoric
“may not have any relation to the deliberation of policy” (339). W ander points out that
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one cannot directly access the underlying factors behind official rhetoric. After all, when
we consider the multi-dimensional and complex nature of this specific relationship
together with the national security issues associated with it, we can be certain that the
substance of official rhetoric is not likely to signal a full-blown explanation of the
philosophical, strategic, or economic foundations of US-Saudi foreign policy. Although I
agree with the notion that official statements may not say anything about the real interests
involved, what they do not say can actually tell us something. For example, secrecy may
characterize the interests of a relationship simply because no information is offered in a
positive way. The distinct absence of information may actually constitute a revealing
message in itself.
Secondly, the issue of secrecy opens many doors for rhetorical analysis. If
official rhetoric about US-Saudi diplomacy tells us nothing about the ‘true’ nature of the
relationship, then what does it tell us? As Wander (1984) points out, a complete account
of foreign policy rhetoric must examine first, its “ceremonial nature,” and second, its
“function in domestic politics” before observing its squaring with history (340). W ander
implies that foreign policy rhetoric is either ceremonial or aimed at domestic audiences
more than it is intended to give a descriptive account of the policy or relationship in
question. In the context of US-Saudi diplomacy, this idea remains salient insofar as it
confirms what this chapter was intended to prove: the scope and interests underlying the
relationship are far too complex, multi-dimensional, and often times unknown to allow
for direct connections between official rhetoric and historical fact. Moreover, when we
consider the necessity for secrecy in the relationship, this becomes even more evident.
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Beyond secrecy, the numerous dimensions and complexities in this relationship
help inform a proper rhetorical analysis by providing an overview of a long and
complicated relationship that has all to often been simplified, promoted, or criticized in
the mainstream media without acknowledgement of these many nuances and ambiguities.
In the next chapter, these complexities and multiple dimensions become important issues
as W hite House officials attempt to explain this relationship to the public amidst heated
regional conflict in the West Bank, and growing public suspicion about the relationship
among both W estern and Arab audiences.
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III Analysis
In this chapter, I will outline the emergence of two strategies -prophetic dualism,
and domestication (Wander, 1984; Schiappa, 1989). Discussing the first of these, I will
explain how White House rhetoric bolsters claims about the relationship’s importance to
world peace and the war on terror hetoric by making use o f a strategy W ander called
prophetic dualism (1984). Secondly, I will outline the White H ouse’s use of another
strategy that Schiappa called domestication (1989), in which several relational metaphors
personify an image of a strong US-Saudi relationship. There I will show how official
rhetoric described the content of the US-Saudi talks through a set of metaphors like
friendship, family, and western hospitality, to overtly personify the relationship.
However, to fully describe the rhetorical situation in which White House rhetoric
appears, a brief summary of audience is in order.
One of the major issues facing US-Saudi diplomacy in the Spring of 2002 was the
torrent of public criticism of the relationship, both in the US and within the Saudi
Kingdom. W ith deeply interconnected business, political, financial, strategic, and
military actors, the relationship has become a magnet for critics who perceive
impropriety. Indeed, one of the major problems facing the administration is the task of
justifying and promoting a relationship that by its very nature is shrouded in strict secrecy
and protected by national security interests as well as those of military, industrial, and
political elites, as explained in Chapter II. At the heart of most criticisms are the
profitable relationships between the Saudi Royal family and many members of the Bush
family. These connections exist by way of a revolving door between the private and
public sectors of US policy, defense, and intelligence organizations, as outlined in
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Chapter II. These critics highlight the multi-billion dollar investments between these two
families through their political and business associates. Here arises the central strategic
problem of communicating about a diplomatic relationship that encapsulates a wealth of
criticism with both foreign and domestic audiences.
Several foreign and domestic audiences had an interest in President B ush’s April
25 address and in Subsequent W hite House addresses. On the domestic front, voters
were still uncertain o f the nature of the US-Saudi partnership. Public criticism in major
US press outlets continued to assail the relationship on issues of Saudi anti-terror efforts,
terrorist sponsorship, and the Kingdom’s ability to produce the 9-11 hijackers. Voters
may have also been concerned about the price of oil at the time. Another domestic
audience was also interested in this issue. Investors, especially those reluctantly clinging
to their energy-sector holdings after the Enron escapade were equally sensitive about the
volatility of energy prices in relation to the price of oil and petroleum; they were also
concerned with the growing escalations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has
frequently impacted the price of oil. Nonetheless, oil prices, regional stability, and
terrorism weighed on the minds of domestic audiences.
In terms of international audiences, the Arab world as well as Japanese energy
investors each had a stake in the meeting. Arabs continue to observe the tenor and tone
of US-Saudi diplomacy. On one hand, many may object to an image of closeness or
friendliness between President Bush and the Crown Prince Abdullah. It may signal the
weakened stance of anti-westerners who denounce the US troop presence on Muslim holy
land. Terrorists within Saudi Arabia claim an interest in the relationship for these central
reasons, and were another key audience. On the other hand, many Arabs who opposed
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Jewish expansion in Palestinian territory have favored the notion of closeness between
the US and Saudi Arabia insofar as it signals the U S’s willingness to appease Arab
interests when balanced against the expansive and influential Jewish lobby. They may
have also perceived increased legitimacy in an Arab nation who appeared to court
western interests.
Outside the Arab world, Japan, which is Saudi Arabia’s other major energy
importer, had a considerable stake in the US-Saudi talks. One could easily speculate that
Japanese energy investors were curious about the tone and topic of the talks. If the US
signaled a closer relationship with the Saudis, what might be the implications for
Japanese interests? Israeli-Palestinian violence threatened further volatility in global
energy markets, which explained one significant Japanese stake in US-Saudi diplomacy.
In sum, international audiences were closely tuned to the tone and topic of the talks,
looking for signals that might foreshadow developments in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis,
or any notable impacts on the price of Saudi oil. Arabs in particular were more
concerned with the perceived closeness or friendliness between President Bush and the
Crown Prince.
Responding to the unique sensitivities of both foreign and domestic audiences,
White House officials discussed the US-Saudi talks through two distinctive strategies, the
first of which appeared in an attempt to include the Saudis as our allies in the President’s
‘war on terror.’
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Prophetic Dualism: Good vs. Evil, the War on Terror, and the Partnership fo r Peace
The President, during his speech on April 25th, 2002, described the US-Saudi
relationship as a unique partnership, one that helped satisfy the U S’s efforts toward peace
in the Middle-East. He re-assured audiences that the relationship was both important and
strong, signaling a sense of near complacency while attempting to address the escalating
violence between Palestinian and Israeli troops. In the wake of this conflict, the President
focused on Saudi Arabia’s position as a potential peace partner, one that might help
dissolve the spiking conflict to ensure a more stable region and assist the U S’s war on
terror. As explained here, the President’s descriptions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
use a good-vs.-evil motif in which the Saudis battle terror by promoting a peaceful
standoff. In doing so, W hite House rhetoric conformed to a strategy that W ander (1984)
called Prophetic Dualism because the President created a good-vs.-evil battle via the war
on terror, one in which the Saudis appeared as our partners for peace.
As the President and other W hite House spokespersons illustrated the importance
of the US-Saudi partnership “to the cause of peace and stability in the Middle East and
the world,” they focused on Saudi cooperation on two pivotal issues: the war on terror
and the Middle East peace process (April 25). To do so, however, they highlighted
certain characters and nations as playing a good or evil role by making both implicit and
explicit reference to the ‘axis of evil,’ and other motifs found in President B ush’s 2002
State of the Union Address. In this speech, the President described the world in terms of
a good-vs.-evil motif, (which became an important fixture in the April 25, 2005, address).
A popular convention for framing international conflicts, the good vs. evil motif
has served several administrations preceding George W. Bush’s, and has become a
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frequent rhetorical tool for interpreting the complexities of foreign affairs. In the
Crawford address, Bush, like his two predecessors, relied on renditions of the Cold W ar
dichotomy between good and evil to dramatize the U S’s war on terror. This description
of the world’s geopolitical landscape in terms of moral right and universal good became a
metaphorical stage upon which Bush told a dramatic narrative likened to the Cold War
Drama outlined in Stuckey’s (1995) essay. In effect, this dramatic narrative used a
metaphor through which the public gained an understanding of a complex conflict.
As an orientational metaphor, The Cold W ar Drama encapsulates national actors
through dramatic narratives like those found in the prolific battle between Soviet
Communism and Western Democracy that emerged during the Cold War. Cast as an
‘evil em pire’ made most popular in President Reagan’s speeches, the Soviet Union was
described as a great evil force in the world, one with which the US fought a noble and
successful battle. It is a story that relies upon what Phillip W ander described as a
prophetic dualism, or a dichotomous division of the world between forces of good and
evil (1995; 1984). Although it may have served well during the proxy-wars between the
W est and Communism, this Manichean dualism between good and evil is more difficult
to apply in recent times without some adaptation to historical circumstances. Namely,
without a visible looming global superpower like the former Soviet Union, a more
contemporary adaptation o f this morally dichotomous worldview relies upon a new figure
of evil, the “axis of evil,” which emerges in Bush’s post-9-11 rhetoric as he outlines the
war on terror.
The most salient example of the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor first appeared in President
Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address. Following the traumatic events of 9-11, the
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President outlined the U S’s policies toward combating terror across the globe. In doing
so, he made reference to several state-sponsors of terror as one cohesive group, the “axis
of evil.” In the following passage from B ush’s 2002 State of the Union address (Jan. 29,
2002), we see the prolific introduction of this slogan into public dialogue.
States like these (North Korea, Iran, and Iraq), and their allies, constitute an axis
of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide
arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack
our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the
price of indifference would be catastrophic. (Jan. 29, 2002)
Similar to the “evil empire” slogan attached to the former Soviet Union, the “axis of evil”
sets the stage of global conflict in terms of good and evil, right and wrong. Here, the axis
of evil encompasses several national actors like North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, but also
includes their allies —all of whom are “arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Jan.
29, 2002). The axis of evil brings together a list of the U S’s enemies through an
orientational metaphor that describes conflict in morally-laden terms (Stuckey, 1995). In
classic fashion, the US is on the good side of a battle between good and evil - a battle
where the outcome is either a more peaceful world, or one in which our elusive enemies
continue to “pose a grave and growing danger” (Jan. 29, 2002). These enemies are
among “tens of thousands o f ... dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder,
often supported by outlaw regimes,” and are “spread throughout the world like ticking
time bombs, set to go off without warning” (Jan. 29, 2002). It is in the context of these
descriptions that the President’s “war on terror” takes shape as a moral imperative to
protect the US and its allies from states “arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Jan.
29, 2002). It is in light of these fearsome descriptions that the White House rhetoric
makes a distinct contrast when discussing Saudi relations. The construction of evil in the
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post-9-11 narrative, involving characters described above in situations that pose ‘grave
danger’ to the peaceful world, is an important literary component to the W hite H ouse’s
depiction of its relationship with Saudi Arabia, which is distinctively friendly, warm, and
cordial, hence, a ‘partnership for peace.’
The narrative of the U S’s post-9-11 experience in the war on terror allows the
President and other officials to position the Saudis as our partners in the war on terror more specifically, as our partners in the battle for world peace. Officials appeal to ideas
like partnership and Arab multi-lateralism when they describe the Saudis and Crown
Prince Abdallah as visionary leaders of world peace. Here, depictions of the Saudis as
our partners for peace, allies against terrorism, and leaders in the ongoing Middle-East
crises between Israel and Palestine display the ‘importance’ of the US-Saudi partnership.
When talking about the US-Saudi relationship, for example, Bush uses the
interlocking terms of “partnership” and “peace.” His rhetoric associates these two terms
with the Saudis to paint a positive image o f their role in world affairs, which we see in
the following excerpt from the April 25th Crawford address:
Our partnership is important to both our nations. And it is important to the
cause of peace and stability in the Middle East and the world. We
discussed the critical importance of the war on terror. Much of our
discussion centered on the Middle East, and how to defuse the current
situation so we can get back on the path to peace.
This passage describes two items. It outlines both the substance and goals of the
relationship. Substantively speaking, W ashington and Riyadh are in a ‘partnership,’ the
goal of which is ‘peace and stability in the Middle East, and the W orld.’ O f more
concrete importance to the relationship are several items: the war on terror, defusing
Arab-Israeli conflict, and more generally, the cause of peace in the world and within the
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Arab region. The word ‘important,’ is a functional linkage between ‘nations,’ ‘peace,’
‘stability,’ and the ‘war on terror.’ ‘Important’ becomes a vehicle of association; it
associates the Saudis with peace, stability, and the war on terror. These associations also
serve a second function as they help construct a metaphor for describing the relationship.
As an orientational metaphor, the war on terror re-situates the US-Saudi
relationship by framing its goals in light of this global initiative, rather than the multitude
of other overlapping interests between the parties, which become trivial details in light of
the dramatic narrative into which the two nations are drawn. Outlining the implicit
purpose of the meeting, Bush frames the relationship in terms of moral goals associated
with stability and peace in the context of the war on terror, stating that “our discussion
centered on the Middle East, and how to defuse the current situation [to] get back on the
path to peace” (April 25). And while this conception of the war on terror helps situate the
purpose of the meeting within moral framing, it also helps situate the Saudis as our
partners for peace. The ‘partnership for peace,’ however, takes place within a larger
regional context, which may allows the administration to emphasize a multi-lateral
approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, another key topic of the address.

Creating the Appearance o f Leadership: The Role o f Arab Multilateralism
A regional multilateral approach to both the war on terror and the Middle-East
peace process was another key concept that appeared in B ush’s address. A central
component of the war on terror is the idea that the U S’s regional allies will help quell
conflict and stop the spread of terrorism. This notion of Arab multilateralism in which
the Saudis become part of a larger effort toward world peace is one that also helps
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magnify the Crown Prince’s leadership. During his April 25th address, Bush dramatized
this role, saying the Saudi Crown Prince “recognizes that America can’t do it alone... it’s
going to require a unified effort,” but he added that the Crown Prince is “a man with
enormous influence in the Middle E a s t... I ’m confident we can work together to achieve
a peace” (April 25). Bush implies a nod toward Arab multilateralism, and positions the
Crown Prince as a leader in that effort. Bush depicts their meeting as an attempt to
“solidify” a multilateral effort toward peace; he added that “our discussion ... was how to
get back on the path to peace” (April 25). He stressed the need for “withdrawal by
Israel” and “for the Palestinian Authority to clamp down on terror” -tw o goals to which
Arab leaders like Abdullah can pledge their support. More broadly, the role of a multi
lateral Arab effort helps position the Crown Prince, and the Saudis, as leaders in a
regional effort to resolve Israeli-Palestinian standoffs and what Bush describes as
Palestinian support for terrorism.
The White House’s emphasis on Arab Multilateralism also allowed for more
glowing descriptions of the Crown Prince. After all, ongoing peace efforts rely not only
on a multi-lateral initiative, but more specifically upon a leader to initiate change. The
multilateral approach to these issues creates a rhetorical opportunity for White House
speechwriters to position the Saudis as stepping up to lead the charge. Inasmuch as their
leadership supports an end to violence and state-sponsored terrorism, the Saudis continue
to play a good role in the fight against evil encompassed in the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor
discussed above. This notion of leadership extends into Bush’s descriptions of the Crown
Prince as well.
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Leadership functions in two ways in Bush’s rhetoric. As described above, Saudi
leadership facilitates a multi-lateral solution to the war on terror and the “Path to Peace,”
as Bush frequently refers to it (April 25). But the leadership theme also facilitates a
dramatic role, into which Saudi Leader Abdullah can step. Bush explained how much he
appreciated the Prince’s “vision for a peaceful and integrated Middle East,” and also how
he “appreciated his leadership in helping rally the Arab world toward that vision” (April
25). Here, the idea of visionary leadership is closely connected with Bush’s hopes for a
multi-lateral solution.
Conversely, the notion of Arab multilateralism positions the Crown Prince in the
role of a visionary peace-maker, which fits nicely within the war on terror’s moralistic
rhetoric. Bush’s positive characterizations of the Crown Prince, bolsters this impression.
In a press conference following a major withdrawal o f Israeli troops, Bush elaborated:
As we work to improve the security situation in the region, all o f us must step up
our efforts... I called Crown Prince Abdallah to thank him for his visit... The
Crown Prince has offered a number of constructive ideas for making political
progress between Israel and the Palestinians. W e will continue to build on these
ideas, as we move forward to fight terror and to promote peace in the Middle
East. (April 28)

This passage best supports a perception of the Crown Prince as a diligent proponent of
peace. His “constructive ideas for making political progress” appear to have facilitated,
in part, the announced withdrawal of Israeli forces from A rafat’s compound, and also
from Ramallah - a move the Israeli cabinet announced just hours before this address on
April 28. As Bush stressed his desire to “continue to build on these ideas as we move
forward” he seemed to imply that the Prince’s “constructive ideas” played and would
continue to play a central role in the ongoing peace processes. Coming after a short
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statement that was critical of Chairman Arafat (April 28), this statement paints a more
glowing picture of the Crown Prince, simply by way of juxtaposition. But if the Crown
Prince was worried about the public perceiving ambiguity in his role as a peaceproponent, he must have appreciated a speech given by White House National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice on April 29th, where she explained the role of Arab
multilateralism and Saudi Leadership.
During a foreign policy address at Johns Hopkins University on April 29th, Dr.
Rice was asked a question that President Bush had been asked just days earlier when
prodded to comment on the “Abdallah Plan” for Middle-East Peace. In her response, she
explained:
Every element of [the plan] may not be workable... But we need to keep our eye
on the big picture here, and the promise of deeper Saudi engagement in the peace
process would be a tremendous breakthrough for the entire process. The truth of
the matter is that while we all focus very heavily on the Israeli-Palestinian piece
of this, this, of course, takes place in a regional context... Israel has to have
security with its neighbors; it has to have normal relations with its neighbors... It
needs to move to normal relations with the other Arab states. And the Arab
states, who also have a stake in the way that the Israeli-Palestinian issues are
resolved, have to have a stake in the final outcome of those negotiations.
So we believe that what the Saudi initiative most represents is a new impetus to
have Saudi engaged as Jordan and Egypt have been in bringing peace to the
region as a whole. And so we have been extremely positive about it; w e’ve
embraced the concept in large parts... we think it’s a tremendously powerful tool
and [an] extremely important step in this long-running conflict. (April 29)
Dr. Rice, a respected expert in Soviet affairs and balance of power issues, makes a welldeveloped case for Arab multilateralism. She stresses the importance of other regional
“neighbors” in resolving this dispute. She also describes the conflict as a “process”
rather than a specific negotiation, which helps her build-up the importance of regional
actors like the Saudis. In sum, however, she paints a shining picture of the Crown Prince
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as someone whose ideas for peace are having a catalytic impact upon the peace process a “tremendous breakthrough,” “a new impetus” for engagement, and ultimately, “a
tremendously powerful tool and [an] important step in this long-running conflict” (April
29). Her descriptions help situate the Prince in a superlative light within the broader idea
of Arab multilateralism with which she frames this issue.
Other officials also echoed the multilateral position. In his May 1 press briefing,
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer also reiterated the role of Arab nations in Middle East peace
during:
It’s always been the President’s view that the way to bring peace to the Middle
East was to work with the Israelis, the Palestinian Authority, and the Arab
nations, to find ways for all the parties to work together. And that involves
multiple conversations on multiple levels... It’s always going to be interactive.
(May 1, 2002)
This “interactive,” multilateral approach makes a good deal of sense; after all, one
usually thinks of negotiations as quickly resolved with handshakes from the sides
involved -essentially a facilitative bi-lateral event akin to the failed negotiations between
Sharon and Arafat during the Clinton administration. Officials described the issue as a
“long-running conflict,” and add although the Saudi plan is “tremendously powerful,” it
is merely an “important step” in the larger process (Rice, April 29, 2002). Adding a
sense of longevity to the peace effort, Dr. Rice reminded her audience that “we need to
keep our eye on the big picture here, and the promise of deeper Saudi engagement in the
peace process would be a tremendous breakthrough for the entire process” (April 29,
2002). Rice’s choice of the word “breakthrough” also echoes Bush’s April 25th
statement, when he characterized the Crown Prince’s condolences toward Israel as a
“breakthrough moment.”
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Dr. Rice also expanded her conception of the conflict as a “process” in order to
place value on both regional multilateralism, and hence on the Crown Prince’s leadership
therein (April 29, 2002). Emphasis on process meshes nicely with official discussion of
Arab multi-lateralism and the value of “multiple level” discussions (April 29, 2002). The
multi-party, process-oriented, coalition-building approach to conflict clearly favors those
who can lead -presum ably leaders of “tremendous influence” like Abdullah (Bush, April
25). It seems that the administration underscores their long-term hopes for peace by
including other nations into the peace process. If this were simply a bi-lateral issue, then
more emphasis could focus on the two state actors involved, but given this expanded
framing, and Bush’s de-valuirig of Arafat’s ability to aid the peace process (discussed
below), Arab leaders like the Crown Prince are in an improved position to help facilitate
the process.
As it relates to the White House’s overall framing o f the US-Saudi relationship,
Dr. Rice’s speech helped reinforce the moralistic framing o f the relationship by
emphasizing the important Saudi role in the Middle-East peace process. As echoed
throughout other officials’ statements, R ice’s expanded conception of Arab
multilateralism allows Saudi leadership to assume a pivotal role both within the IsraeliPalestinian resolution and with the broader war on terror as well. But this expanded
conception of regional cooperation is not the only rationale that helps position the Crown
Prince.
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Highlighting Cooperation and Condemnation
W hat also improved the Crown Prince’s role in the war on terror narrative was his
public condemnation of terror, which the W hite House continually emphasized in its
statements. In his April 25th address, Bush stated he “appreciated the Crown Prince’s
assurances that Saudi Arabia condemns terror.” Shortly afterwards, during a questionand-answer period, Bush elaborated further on Abdullah’s stance toward terror, and
seemed to emphasize Abdallah’s rhetoric more frequently than his actions:
The Crown Prince has been very strong in condemning the murder of U.S.
citizens. He’s been very strong about condemning those who committed those
murders. And I appreciate that a lot. Right after 9/11, he was one of the strongest
voices of condemnation. He understands how devious Osama bin Laden has
been. He knows that - that anybody who— you know, that a strategy by some
would be to split the United States and Saudi Arabia. It’s a strong and important
friendship, and he knows that and I know that, and w e’re not going to let that
happen. So he’s been very strong in the condemnation of terror, for which I’m
grateful. (April 25)
In B ush’s depiction, the Saudi Prince not only stands against terror publicly, but also has
empathy for the US in the war on terror because his country was an indirect target in the
attacks. As Bush somewhat reluctantly explained, the 9-11 planners, including Osama
bin Laden, were attempting to sever the US-Saudi relationship, which would hurt both
parties. By repositioning the Saudis as victims of this tragedy, Bush allows the public to
view the Saudis not only as our friends by referring to the US-Saudi “friendship,” but
also associates them as an ally in the fight against the axis of evil through their mutual
suffering of 9-11. Again, helping the Saudis stand on our side in the metaphorical battle
between forces of good and evil, the generic evidence of Saudi condemnation supports a
conclusion that the Saudis are our allies in a global effort to fight terror.
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Bush also supports claims about Saudi cooperation in other statements, which
attempt to show specific evidence of US-Saudi aid in the war on terror. He referred to
US-Saudi intelligence-sharing, Saudis “cutting o f f ’ terrorist money, and ongoing
attention to security along the Yemeni border to “make sure that Yemen doesn’t become
a haven for al Qaeda killers,” to demonstrate the President’s claims that the Saudis made
several efforts to stabilize the region (April 25). By facilitating a more stable MiddleEast, the Saudis help create a safer and more peaceful world, and become our valued
partners for peace.
Unfortunately for reporters, the President never gives any specific examples
beyond his general references. On this point, the issue of secrecy becomes very
important in relation to W hite House rhetoric on the Saudis. As outlined in Chapter II,
the US-Saudi relationship is based upon regional strategic interests that relate to the U S’s
vital economic and military interests. Especially when dealing with security issues, the
President may lack the ability to provide specific evidence of bi-lateral cooperation on
the terrorism issue in particular. On the other hand, this is one of the major criticisms of
the Saudi regime -its instability and negligence in preventing terrorist recruitment and
funding within its borders and beyond. Nonetheless, when interpreting official White
House rhetoric on the issue of terrorism, the evidence one must analyze becomes murky
with vague references like the ones mentioned above. In the end however, these
statements help characterize the Crown Prince and the Saudis as allies in the morally
dichotomous struggle between good and evil.
Within this epic struggle, a positive characterization of the Saudis and their
Crown Prince relies upon three ideas that have been so far discussed. First, is the
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“Abdullah plan,” or the Saudi peace plan, which demonstrates that the Saudis, Prince
Abdullah specifically, have unique and proven ideas for peace. Second is the notion of
Saudi leadership in the W hite House’s discussion of Arab Multilateralism. Third is the
idea of Saudi cooperation in the war on terror, which arises in W hite House
characterizations of the Saudi condemnations of terror. Taken together, these ideas help
shape a polished narrative about the US-Saudi relationship that fits nicely into a
contemporary rendition of the Cold W ar saga between good and evil.
These three ideas -th e Saudi vision of peace, Saudi leadership in the Arab states,
and Saudi condemnation of terror, all address Bush’s opening claims about the
relationship and its “importance.” They also help support the Administration’s
multilateral approach to the region. In sum, these three statements serve as evidence
supporting Bush’s characterizations of the relationship. As evidence, these claims
support a specific conclusion about the Saudis, as depicted in abstract argumentation
below:
Premise: Saudis value peace
Sub-Claim 1: Saudis want peace between Israel and Palestine
Evidence 1: Saudis lead Arab multi-lateral Middle-East peace talks
Sub-Claim2: Saudis want peace in the world
Evidence 2 : Saudi leaders condemn terror
W arrant: Saudi partnership is “important to the cause of peace and stability in
the Middle-East and the W orld” (April 25).

Although logically arranged here, these arguments are much more diffused as they appear
in the texts of official rhetoric. Terms like “partnership,” “peace,” “leadership,” and
“importance” cement the logical construction of ideas which frame our thoughts about
the relationship. These word associate subjects like the US, the Crown Prince, and Arab
states, with concepts that are central to Bush’s depictions of the relationship. His
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statements rely on descriptions to frame the public’s impressions of various actors in this
dramatic rendition. The word “importance” for example, does not say much by way of
specifics; it simply attaches value to a certain subject, like “peace,” “partnership,” or the
“war on terror,” and subsequently frames the Saudis and other Arab states as mutually
invested in this effort.
When discussing US interests in the Middle-East conflict, Bush focuses on the
“shared vision,” between the US and the Saudis, an idea that permeates his April 25
address. He explains the U S’s position on the violent escalations in Rammallah and
Bethlehem as a centerpiece of his policy toward the Middle-East, and frequently
highlights the role of Arab states in resolving this conflict, namely, the visionary
leadership of the Crown Prince Abdullah. He continually emphasizes this regional
approach, as seen in his opening statement, when he states that “Our two nations share a
vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security,”
adding that “all parties have responsibilities to help achieve that vision” (April 25). Here,
he underlines the significance of the issue, and his belief in a regional approach that
involves “all parties” - a nod to Arab nations in the region (April 25). He symbolically
reiterates the idea of a US-Arab partnership as the fulcrum of current resolution efforts.
In doing so, Bush seems to distinguish himself from Presidents like Clinton, who relied
less upon Arab partners by maintaining a more direct, unilateral approach to the conflict,
like the direct approach he took in the legendary talks that culminated in a rare hand
shake between the two Middle-East leaders. In contrast, Bush’s expanded approach limits
perceptions of US interventionism and underscores the value of Arab leadership as a
chief component to this multilateral regional effort.
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The concept of Arab multilateralism then becomes an anchoring device for Arab
leadership insofar as it sets-up the Crown Prince Abdallah in a role of peace-maker.
Building on his descriptions of Arab multilateralism, Bush introduces several ideas that
help construct a policy of US reliance on Arab states both to combat terrorism, and to
mitigate the flaring tensions in the West Bank. This policy helps situate a more
complementary rendition of the Saudis, as described here in an excerpt from B ush’s April
25th address:
We discussed the need for Arab states to condemn terror, to stop
incitement of violence, and as part of a long-term peace, to accept Israel as
a nation and a neighbor. We also agreed the world must join in offering
humanitarian aid to the many innocent Palestinians who are suffering.
I told the Crown Prince how much I appreciate his vision for a peaceful
and integrated Middle East, and how I appreciated his leadership in
helping rally the Arab world toward that vision. I also appreciated the
Crown Prince’s assurance that Saudi Arabia condemns terror.
Bush paints a picture of US reliance on multiple Arab partners to facilitate its interests in
the region. This multi-lateral approach positions the Crown Prince as its invaluable
leader in “helping rally the Arab world toward that vision” (April 25). From this passage,
one can see the complementary interaction between the notions of Arab multilateralism
and Arab leadership. This interaction facilitates the re-positioning of the Crown Prince as
an influential visionary of peace.
Indeed, Bush’s explanation above grooms Abdallah as a prominent US peace
partner. During questioning at the April 25th address, Bush described the Crown Prince
as “a man with enormous influence in the Middle East,” and added, “I respect that a lot,
and I ’m confident we can work together to achieve a peace.” After enhancing the
Prince’s diplomatic credibility, Bush took several opportunities to spin a more positive
framing of the Crown Prince, as in the following excerpt:
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W e’re interested in his advice, w e’re interested in his counsel. We share a
vision and I reminded him how much I appreciated his statement toward
Israel. I thought that was a breakthrough m om ent... And then he went and
sold that in Beirut, and I appreciated that as well

Here, Bush offers several examples to support a positive framing of the Prince’s role as a
multi-lateral Arab partner. First, Bush creates the Abdallah-as-diplomatic-partner image,
and expresses interest in his “advice,” and “counsel,” which denotes the role of an
advisor or counselor, implying he is the U S’s trusted friend. We typically assume an
advisor or counselor is someone with some sort of technical, professional, or expertiserelated credentials to deserve our trust and consideration. Secondly, Bush reiterates their
shared commitment to peace in the W est Bank to highlight the Prince’s “breakthrough”
condolences towards Israel. Lastly, and most importantly, the President refers to
A bdallah’s participation in a recent Arab Summit in Beirut as evidence to his strong
leadership within Arab diplomatic circles. Referring to his “breakthrough” statement that
he “went... and sold ... in Beirut,” he offers evidence to support his positive rendition of
the Prince’s leadership. This leadership role not only builds a more positive public
impression, but also demonstrates how this Arab partner facilitates US regional interests.
Thus the Crown Prince is both a practical and attractive ally.
Again, by focusing on overlapping interests in Middle-East peace, officials
describe the peace process in terms of goals and means. Our goal is a “lasting peace,”
and dependable Arab leadership is a means to facilitate this goal. The Crown Prince plays
a crucial role in that effort by “rallying the Arab world,” and more importantly Arab
states, behind our shared cause. The idea o f Arab leadership is difficult to support,
however, because one must assume a link between symbolic and national leadership. By
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describing the Prince as the a leader in rallying the “Arab W orld,” Bush implies a sense
of symbolic leadership between Crown Prince Abdallah and the Arab world akin to the
symbolic leadership of the Pope for practicing Catholics and the Catholic community at
large. The veracity of Bush’s descriptions thus become difficult to assess without
regional expertise. Although difficult to support, the President may not need to; his
depictions are aimed at an audience of Americans, most of whom have little knowledge
of Arab culture to which they could make a comparison. It is perhaps with this
knowledge of audience that White House rhetoric develops a sharp contrast between
Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat and Crown Prince Abdallah.

Arab Leadership, Multilateralism, and the Vilification o f Yasir Arafat
To shine a more positive light on the Prince, the White House vilifies Palestinian
leader Yasir Arafat in its public assessments of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. White
House statements frequently describe Arafat as an obstacle to regional peace. In a May 1st
conference Secretary Fleischer said that “The United States will continue to press the
Palestinian Authority to fulfill their obligations to stop terrorism” (May 1). Implying the
Palestinian leader’s lapse in responsibility, Fleischer’s comment reflects the general tenor
of White House rhetoric. During his April 25th address, Bush explained:
The Palestinian Authority must do more to stop terror. Israel must finish
its withdrawal, including resolution of standoff in Rammallah and
Bethelem, in a non-violent way. We discussed the need for Arab states to
condemn terror, to stop incitement of violence, and as part of a long-term
peace, accept Israel as a nation and a neighbor.
The statement about the “need for Arab states to condemn terror” implies that Arafat has
not been doing this. By contrast, Bush applauds Saudi leadership just a moment later,
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saying “I appreciated the Crown Prince’s assurances that Saudi Arabia condemns terror”
(April 25). By positing the need for the Palestinian Authority to “clamp down on terror,”
while simultaneously applauding the Saudis, Bush sets-up a kind o f good-guy-versusbad-guy scenario. The Saudis, good guys, are trying to facilitate peace, and we are
working with them in that effort. Meanwhile, Arafat becomes the bad guy by appearing
to halt or slow the process. Audiences may see Arafat as an obstacle to peace because
they may perceive an unwillingness on his part to stop terrorism.
Moreover, in light of B ush’s multilateral framing of the peace process, he can
reasonably urge Arab states like the Saudis to help prod the Palestinians in this direction.
He acknowledges a very limited Israeli involvement, as though all the Israelis were trying
to do is withdraw from Palestinian territory, and shifts much of the responsibility on Mr.
Arafat, and upon Arab leadership as an impetus to a resolution. Again, this division
between good and evil seems to eliminate many of the nuances of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Bush’s statement outlines the conflict through a simplistic problem-solution
order. In the quote above, the Palestinian Authority (and Mr. Arafat by association) are
the problem by not doing more to stop terror. For this statement to be true, we are to
logically assume through logic that the “terror” to which Bush refers arises solely from
Palestinian territory and is hence the sole responsibility of the Palestinian Authority.
After clarifying this as the central problem, Bush makes a generalized nod to the Israelis,
and then calls upon Arab states to “condemn terror, to stop incitement of violence, and as
part of a long term peace, accept Israel as a nation and a neighbor” (April 25). Here, he
positions the Palestinian Authority and Mr. Arafat as the problem, and an emerging
coalition of Arab states as a solution.
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By implication, Bush also seems to define Palestinian aggression as terrorism,
while Israeli force might not carry the same connotation. Secondly, he addresses the role
of Arab states in reigning-in Arafat by way of implication. During questioning following
his April 28th address, Bush offered the following statements in regards to the Palestinian
leader.
Mr. Arafat must perform. Mr. Arafat must do his job. I ’ve called upon
Mr. Arafat in the past, I ’ll continue to call upon Mr. Arafat to lead. The
other day -som ebody asked me one time, a while ago, they said, has he
disappointed you, has he lost your respect. I said, well, he hasn’t earned
my respect yet. He must earn my respect by leading. And there are a lot
of people, a lot of Palestinians who are suffering, and now is the time for
him to step up. (April 28)
Here, Bush seems to blame Arafat both for the violence against Israel, but also for the
suffering of the Palestinians. Bush’s rhetoric seems to turn all sides against Arafat by
painting him as an obstacle to peace, who must “step up” to “earn my respect” (April 28).
The issue of respect that emerges in this quote adds a personal tone to the President’s
characterizations of Arafat. B ush’s explanation of how Mr. Arafat “must earn my respect
by leading” implies a personal issue between the two leaders (April 28).
Aside from implicitly laying blame, this statement suggests the Palestinian leader
must measure up, or prove himself to Bush. It carries the message that Arafat is not
stepping up, so to speak, in the peace process. Compared with the Saudi Crown Prince,
whose role in the peace process is nearly fawned over by the administration, Arafat
appears to drag his heels. It leads the reader to conclude that Middle-East conflict results
from the failed leadership of Yasir Arafat, not from the myriad of circumstantial, cultural,
and historical factors contributing to this epic conflict. In effect, Arafat’s vilification
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serves makes him appear threatening both to the Israelis and to his own people. Hence,
he stands figuratively on the other side of a line between good and evil.
As discussed above, Bush’s criticisms of the Palestinian Chairman serve a
dramatic purpose as they personify Arafat in contrast to the Crown Prince. They may
also reflect Bush’s true feelings on the matter, but B ush’s motives are difficult to access.
Recently published accounts of White House dialogues do suggest that President Bush
has strong feelings about Arafat’s role in the Middle East. In his recently published
memoirs from office, former Press Secretary Ari Fleischer described a conversation that
took place in the Spring of 2002 between President Bush and “a respected Arab leader,”
whom Fleischer did not name (2005, 234).
“Arafat can’t get a damn thing done,” Bush complained. “Israel has created a
martyr out of that guy.” The President thought it best if Arafat, who was now
holed up and besieged in his mostly destroyed compound, was simply ignored for
being a failed nonleader [sic] who incited terrorism... Bush was frustrated that
Israel’s focus on Arafat made him a hero to the Palestinian people. The most
influential Arab states that could help achieve peace, Bush thought, were Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt...
Arafat and his immediate, corrupt circle were the real problems, Bush thought not the Palestinian people and not Ariel Sharon. (2005, 234-235).
From public knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, we can deduce that this
meeting took place within weeks, if not days, of the White House addresses between
April 25th and May 2nd. W hat is certain from the conversation, however, is a depiction of
Bush’s attitude toward the conflict. It is clear that he views Arafat as an obstacle to his
efforts in the region. It also appears that Bush perceived the situation in a dramatic
frame, which he evinces in his criticism of A rafat’s “martyr” status; his statement that
“Israel has made a martyr out of that guy” elucidates this point (2005, 234). Perhaps
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Bush reasoned that if one outcome of the conflict was to create a martyr out of Arafat,
then the cycle would continue without any incentive for the parties to change behavior.
In sum, the White House reiterates several points when supporting its claims
about the importance of US-Saudi relations. While officials attempt to put a positive spin
on Saudi cooperation in the war on terror, they more frequently emphasize the Crown
Prince’s visionary leadership toward a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian stand
offs. White House rhetoric constructs the idea of Abdallah’s visionary leadership by
stressing a multilateral approach to the conflict that will necessitate the initiative from
leaders like Abdallah. This regional approach also identifies with other leaders, namely
Yasir Arafat, about whom Bush is particularly critical. By way of contrast, B ush’s
criticisms of Arafat merely help bolster a more polished image of the Saudi Crown
Prince.
The administration also positions the Saudis within the larger historical context of
the war on terror, and in doing so, depicts their role as ‘good-guys’ in the battle against
the ‘axis of evil.’ This characterization becomes an important theme in a new rendition
of the Cold W ar drama. As partners for peace, the Saudis take on a dramatic role as both
peace makers, and also as important US allies in the war on terror. In much the same
way as they were crucial in the U S’s clandestine fight against the Soviets, described in
Chapter II, the Saudis appeared to aid the US in a new proxy-war against worldwide
terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda.
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Relational Metaphors and the Rhetoric o f Domestication
In supporting claims about the strength of the US-Saudi partnership, White House
officials used a strategy of domestication (Schiappa, 1989) to frame the relationship in
terms that were easily-digestible for a wide range of public audiences. As Schiappa
described, domestication strategies use “friendly metaphors drawn from ordinary
language to name otherwise objectionable nuclear weapons, [and] strategy” (1989, 255).
By way of adaptation, the domestication strategy appears when White House officials
describe both the content and purposes of the April 25th meeting through relationship
metaphors that stress personal bonding, intimate conversations, and private interactions.
Below, I will outline the varied appearances of this technique. Attempting to paint a
palatable image of the US-Saudi partnership in the most positive light possible, White
House rhetoric employs three different metaphors to personify the relationship: mutual
appreciation, shared respect, and personal bonding.
Mutual appreciation is a recurring theme used to characterize the content of the
leaders’ discussions. Bush “appreciated the Crown Prince’s assurances...;” he “told the
Crown Prince how much [he] appreciate^] his vision,” and also that he appreciated the
Crown Prince’s promise that “they will not use oil as a weapon” (April 25).
Appreciation, along with other adjectives, describes the relationship in very friendly
terms, but certainly not ordinary. For example, Bush frequently refers to the “shared
vision” between the two countries; hardly a normal friendship, these two parties seem to
become visionaries for peace rather than normal pals at the bowling alley (April 25, April
28). As Bush describes in his April 25th address, “our two nations share a vision o f two
states, Israel and Palestine,” and “there’s a shared vision. .. we must consult with our
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friends.” This frequently recurring idea o f visionary leadership helps frame the
relationship as a partnership for peace. It helps bolster a moralistic impression of the
purpose and tone of the parties’ interactions. It appears that at the heart of the US-Saudi
relationship is a shared vision for peace, which brings them together to forge a strong
bond and move forward with the peace process.
In B ush’s April 25th address, he explains that the Crawford Ranch is “a place that
is very special for me, and a place where I welcome special guests to our country.” This
idea of Saudi “specialness” lays the foundation for a series of depictions designed to
elevate the status of the Saudis as unique, distinctive, and inimitable diplomatic partners -supporting Bush’s claims about the relationship’s strength and importance. First, the
idea that the Saudis are our partners in peace implies their leadership in ongoing IsraeliPalestinian conflicts, where the Crown Prince is “a man with enormous influence in the
Middle East” (April 25).
There are also other descriptions that protect the Saudis from criticism by
elevating the perceived status of the Saudi partnership with reference to 9-11. For
example, in a response to a question about the Saudis involved in the 9-11 attacks, Bush
explained in his April 25th address that “a strategy by some would be to split the United
States and Saudi Arabia,” which nods to an idea that has been developed in other White
House statements. As the argument goes, the fifteen hijackers who were allegedly of
Saudi nationality were intentionally recruited by al Qeada to sever the ties between the
west and the Holy Kingdom. In such a scenario, an angered American public would turn
immediately to the Saudis when laying the blame for 9-11. By setting up the relationship
for failure and public criticism, Osama bin Laden and the 9-11 hijackers were aiming for
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a target that went far beyond the four buildings assaulted in the attacks; they were trying
to destroy the U S’s key oil source and potentially bring down the Saudi regime in the
process (Unger, 2004; Coll, 2004). This strategy might force the removal of US troops
from what Arabs view as the Islamic nation’s epicenter via Medina and Mecca. In this
context, a portrait of the Saudis as victims of 9-11 has three immediate rhetorical
functions that help deflect public criticism from the US-Saudi relationship.
First, through the Saudi-as-victim depiction, Bush attempts to reframe public
perception of Saudi Arabia in light of a good-vs.-evil dualism. Here, Bush’s framing of
9-11 helps support the general notion that the Saudis are victims of 9-11, and hence, on
the ‘good’ side o f the war against terror, i.e. evil. If the 9-11 hijackers were intentionally
trying to sever the ties between the US and the Saudis, then any criticism directed at the
Saudis seems misplaced, for the Saudis were victims of 9-11 just like their American
counterparts. The dualism between good and evil helps categorize the ‘good’ from the
‘bad,’ and helps position the Saudis the former. This is one example of how the dualistic
framing of the war on terror helps shield the Saudis from criticism. It also helps
domesticate the Saudis insofar as it describes them in a simplistic narrative about good
and evil, in which they become easily-identifiable characters fighting against the elusive
threat of terrorism.
Second, it deflects criticism by positioning the Saudis’ critics as aligning
themselves with the enemy. As many critics pointed to the Saudi’s role in funding
terrorism, their inability to control terrorist groups within the country, and the generally
unstable nature o f their domestic rule, criticisms now seem misinformed or short-sighted.
.For example, B ush’s reiteration of the idea that 9-11 was intended to sever the US-Saudi
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connection implies that those who criticize the relationship are doing exactly what the
terrorists wanted. Indeed, one could argue that Osama bin Laden, given his proximity to
the royal family, his deep connections with both Saudi and US intelligence operations,
and his growing animosity toward the west, would make an ideal candidate to draw
criticism on the Saudis. It would seem that any attempt by the US to press the Saudis on
key issues like terror funding and the incubation of radical Islam are illogical because
they serve the enemy’s interests. This notion that the Saudis suffered from 9-11 along
side the US preserves and heightens perceptions of the Saudi partnership by reframing
the Saudis in relation to 9-11 instead o f other, more complicated, issues. This idea also
deflects key criticisms of the Saudi role in producing 15 of the 19 hijackers and their
support for al-Qaeda, in addition to their influential relationship with Wahhabi Islam,
Osama bin Laden, and the Bin Laden family, as discussed in Chapter II. Similarly, the
Saudi-as-victim idea also helps domesticate the Saudis because they become ‘just like
us,’ wounded on the battlefield of good and evil.
Aside from preserving the image of Saudi “specialness” or inimitability, other
descriptions emphasize the mutual respect between the parties. W hen discussing the
content of the discussions, Bush frequently uses the term “respect,” most frequently in his
April 25th address. During the same address, the question of whether the Saudis will use
the “oil weapon” emerged, to which Bush acknowledged that “Saudi Arabia made it
clear, and has made it clear publicly, that they will not use oil as a weapon. And I
appreciate that, respect that, and expect that to be the case.” Throughout his statements,
as well as in subsequent White House responses, the word “respect” reappears describing
the respect the parties have for each other, the mutual respect for the parties, visions of
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peace, and so forth. Respect operates as an adjective with subjects tied to the relationship
-visions, positions, views, and the like. Again, the primary function of this word is to
characterize a diplomatic relationship as if it were a warm friendship.
Another key theme in White House statements is personal bonding, which
personifies the relationship. Terms like partnership, friendship, respect, understanding,
and appreciation, all support a more pervasive theme o f personal bonding, which Bush
relies upon when describing his interactions with the Crown Prince. He uses these
themes to characterize or personify the relationship through simplistic folksy narratives.
During his questioning, Bush provides two narratives that very clearly elucidate the
bonding theme. The first comes after the April 25th address, when Bush responds to a
reporter’s question about his ability to smooth over the Arab leader after B ush’s
description of Ariel Sharon as a “man of peace” (April 25, 2002)
Bush: Well, first of all, one of the really positive things out of this meeting was
the fact that the Crown Prince and I established a strong personal bond. We spent
a lot of time alone, discussing our respective visions, talking about our families. I
was most interested in learning about how he thought about things. I ’m
convinced that the stronger our personal bond is, the more likely it is relations
between our country will be strong... (April 25, 2002)
This passage directly frames the relationship as a personal friendship. O f special
importance is the way Bush describes the content of their relationship. They talked about
what he vaguely describes as “respective visions,” and about their families (April 25).
Bush’s comment that he is “interested” in the Crown Prince’s thoughts says even less
about the true substance of their several-hour meeting (April 25). As Bush’s account
suggests, the two world leaders had an open conversation about their families and views
on the world. This account, however, makes a bold move as it positions a personal
relationship ahead of an official one. Bush’s statement toward the end of this passage
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balances a diplomatic relationship with a personal friendship. He equates a strong
personal bond with a strong bi-lateral relationship, as if diplomacy lies in becoming best
friends with your counterpart before beginning hard-nosed, interest-based conversations.
Here, descriptions of the relationship’s content and purpose converge on the idea that
personal relationships precede official duties. If the President’s friendship with a Saudi
royal is productive, then the relationship between our two countries will prosper as well.
It seems that what is good for George W. Bush is also good for America.
In another response, Bush goes further in-depth about his interactions with the
Crown Prince. Near the end of the April 25th address, Bush responded to a question
about his engagement with Arab nations in the following narrative:
[The meeting] went on quite a while because there was a lot to discuss, plus, I
want you to know, I had the honor of showing him my ranch. H e’s a man who’s
got a farm and he understands the land, and I really took great delight in being
able to drive him around in a pickup truck and showing [sic] him the trees and my
favorite spots. And we saw a wild turkey, which was good. But we had a very
good discussion, and I ’m honored he came to visit. (April 25)
Here we see a story of two men, going for a drive in a pickup truck on a ranch. Their
friendship seems consecrated by this intimate act of male bonding. Apparently, Bush
took the Crown Prince for a drive to show him around, and point out some of his
“favorite spots.” In terms of its ceremonial appeal, the narrative Bush tells above
presents a westernized version of diplomatic formality; it depicts the relationship not just
as an intimate friendship, but as a family affair. The ranch location is important in
facilitating this appearance because, as opposed to the White House, Camp David, or
other diplomatic forums, the ranch is owned by the Bush family, not the US government.
As such, the imagery of this backdrop reinforces the personal dimension of the
relationship.
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There is also a sense of male bonding that emerges in the pickup-truck narrative.
When Bush explained during the April 25th address that “H e’s a man w ho’s got a farm
and he understands the land, and I really took great delight in being able to drive him
around in a pickup truck,” he is telling a story about male bonding. The two apparently
had a long drive and a good conversation, which describes a scene of men bonding on a
western landscape, commenting on wild turkeys and discussing their views on the world.
This fatherly escapade is reminiscent also of a familiar event many would place within
the context of a story about family. Two paternal father figures get away from the house
to talk business and to bond as men. Here, family rhetoric becomes clearer in B ush’s
narrative where descriptions of a friendly sight-seeing tour of the family ranch help
reinforce a familial tone. The context of the B ush’s family ranch paints a picture akin to
a family visit, or a neighbor stopping by on a Saturday afternoon. As opposed to a formal
negotiation, intense trade talks, or other diplomatic functions, the two simply had a
“visit.” According to Bush, the two had a conversation about his favorite locations, the
lay of the land, and other pleasant notables like a wild turkey. His narrations of the day’s
events paint a very folksy, neighborly visit occurring before a backdrop of a Texas family
ranch. In effect, Bush’s narration of the events paints a relatable picture of a diplomatic
meeting. He tells a story about family, friendship, and community in the language of
western narratives and folklore. Bush’s ceremonial descriptions dovetail with the
speech’s central thesis and a crucial rhetorical premise: the US-Saudi relationship is
important and strong. In terms of tone and content, this relationship is framed as part
friendship, part family relation, and part diplomatic partnership. The ceremony takes on
a warm, friendly, feel, with words like “special,” “cordial,” and “honor,” describing the
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meeting and its location; the family ranch is “very special for me,” “a place where I
welcome special guests to our country” (April 25).
The setting of the address also enriches these descriptions. As guests to a
reception at the President’s home in Texas, the Saudis appear to hold pre-imminent
diplomatic status. As opposed to the W hite House, the Saudi Embassy in Washington
D.C., or the US Embassy in Riyadh, the Crawford Ranch appears more personal,
friendly, and familial as a diplomatic venue. It suggests the Saudis are very special and
deserving of the President’s exclusive attention. As the descriptive context of the
address’ metaphorical appeals, the ranch becomes background as descriptions of the
relationship, its participants, and their interactions take the foreground.
Western values also play a central role in the official portrait of the relationship.
By appealing to western notions of family hospitality, the narratives of the diplomatic
visit present a palatable picture of the relationship. By focusing on ceremonial honors,
warm discussions, and friendly pickup truck drives, the narratives found in White House
statements create an impression of the relationship as being removed from its interestbased foundations. Rhetorically, this narrative conceives of a diplomatic relationship as a
friendship, family visit, or a polite neighborly discussion. It indicates little if anything
about the true substance o f the conversation; rather, it distills the meeting into an easily
understood metaphor: a family visit. As with any narrative, B ush’s creates a warm
friendly tone in his descriptions of the form and content of the discussions. Highlighting
such ceremonial details, official rhetoric substitutes descriptive relational metaphors in
place of a more pragmatic outline of the relationship’s real interests.
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By simplifying the relationship into a descriptive metaphor, B ush’s narratives
function as a simplification mechanism akin to Schiappa’s domestication and
bureaucratization motifs (1989). Drawing upon a friendly metaphor from ordinary
language (1989), the Crawford narrative simplifies an otherwise complex relationship
into something easily-understood. The domestication strategy employed in official
rhetoric constructs a descriptive narrative of the relationship that emphasizes mutual
appreciation, shared respect, and personal bonding to create a set of relational metaphors.
In its content, the relationship takes on a friendly, familial, and personal tone while
demonstrating to the audience the ‘strength’ of the partnership. A high-level meeting
between two diplomatic partners becomes a friendly visit between family friends. Hardheaded negotiations become a drive across the ranch to see a wild turkey. When one
considers the strategic dimensions of the US-Saudi partnership, this narrative seems
detached from reality. In this sense, the western narrative “sanitizes” the relationship in a
way that distances the public from it (1989). By developing a mythical re-creation of a
diplomatic partnership, Bush’s address removes the relationship from public criticism by
making only descriptive appeals and depicting the details of a high-level meeting
between two major world powers with themes like family, friendship, and personal
bonding. As with any metaphorical description, the ties between concrete or abstract
descriptions and the collection of values they symbolize is where the persuasive effect
takes its course.
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IV Discussion
After developing both the historical overview and rhetorical analysis in the two
preceding chapters, this Chapter will discuss how previous chapters addressed this
study’s first and second formal research questions. Answering RQ1,1 will discuss how
official rhetoric reframes the public’s understanding o f the US-Saudi partnership.
Considering the conclusions found in the history chapter, we see the real nature of the
US-Saudi partnership has far more to do with complex economic and security issues than
official rhetoric suggested. Here, I argue that the White H ouse’s use of morallydichotomous good-vs.-evil framing, together with its emphasis on domestication
techniques clouds the underlying issues and interests that drive the relationship in favor
of a more passable and simplistic narrative about war and peace.
Secondly, in response to RQ2, the analysis chapter reveals innovative adaptations
of two rhetorical strategies: prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984) and domestication as per
Schiappa (1989). I will first discuss how the White H ouse’s adaptation of prophetic
dualism re-configures conceptions of the Cold W ar drama as per Stuckey (1995).
Specifically, I will first argue that a one-sided construction o f the prophetic dualism
allows official rhetoric to echo the Cold W ar drama within the dichotomous moral
framing of the ‘W ar on Terror.’ Then, I will outline how the W hite H ouse’s use of
descriptive relational metaphors constitutes a new innovation in domestication strategy,
urging a need for scholars to expand Schiappa’s (1989) conception of domestication to
include issues of personification.
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History and its Double
In response to RQ1, the historical overview and analysis chapters tell us much
about the underlying interests of the US-Saudi partnership as well as how W hite House
rhetoric portrays these interests. Official rhetoric clouds the true nature of the US-Saudi
partnership by focusing on a morally-dichotomous rendition of the relationship that fails
to convey any sense of moral ambiguity or realism in terms of the relationship’s
underlying interests.
As outlined in the history chapter, the foundations of the US-Saudi partnership
have always centered on economic and strategic interests that are complex and multi
dimensional. For example, the economic interests in the relationship were far from
simple. While the US benefited from Saudi oil exports as a primary source of crude, it
also experienced a wave of investment in US markets from the estimated $840 billion of
Saudi royal spending (Unger, 2004). On the other hand, the Saudi Kingdom received a
rapid infusion of infrastructure, technology, and military development and training from
the US. In terms of economic interests alone, the relationship encompasses multiple
dimensions each with its own layers of interested parties, companies, government
officials, and so on.
The military component of the relationship, as discussed in Chapter II, is equally
complex and multi-faceted. Chapter II discussed how the Saudis became increasingly
involved in US clandestine military operations in the Middle-East and Central Asia,
primarily to combat the spread of communism and balance regional threats such as Iran’s
Ayatolla or Iraq’s Hussein. But they also became an informal outpost and central
command facility for US troops; from there, US operations during the first Gulf W ar
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would target Iraqi forces from holy Muslim soil. The Saudis also helped recruit a
Muslim army to fight the soviets in Afghanistan, where they enlisted the help of Saudi
Billionare Osama bin Laden, who later lead a team of hijackers to attack the US on 9-11.
These are just three examples of the different military dimensions of the relationship,
each with its own complexities and dynamics.
If anything, these issues -econom ic and strategic, entail multi-dimensional
interests, complexities within each of those interests, and lastly, a pronounced need for
secrecy due to the sensitive nature of each interest. The rhetorical presentation o f this
relationship however, greatly avoids any mention of these nuances, ambiguities, and
underlying interests. In fact, if official rhetoric serves any function in relation to the
actual history of US-Saudi diplomacy, it clouds the ‘real’ nature of the relationship in
exchange for a much more palatable and simplistic rendition.
White House rhetoric, in its adaptations of prophetic dualism and domestication,
obscures important details about the US-Saudi relationship in three different ways. First,
it distorts the underlying interests that drive the partnership. After the 2002 Crawford
meeting, official rhetoric focused on the war on terror and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian
conflicts. Bush described the relationship in terms of its importance to peace in the world
and in the Middle East (April 25), and explained the strength of the relationship in terms
of the warm and personable interactions between President Bush and the Crown Prince
Abdullah. By describing the partnership in terms of its importance to the world and the
Middle-East, Bush reframed the central issues of the partnership in accordance with a
narrow interpretation that fit within the ‘war on terror,’ good vs. evil narrative. It painted
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a sterling picture of the Saudis while masking many unresolved public criticisms of the
relationship.
In contrast, if officials framed the relationship in terms of its importance to each
party, then Middle-East peace and the War on Terror would pale in comparison to the
current price o f oil, the (then imminent) invasion of Iraq, and other salient interests. But
because Bush’s framing supports a specific narrative that emphasizes the war on terror
and the ongoing conflict in the W est Bank, official accounts of mutual interests like oil
supply and regional security are but tertiary concerns within a moralistic narrative about a
battle between good and evil.
Secondly, official rhetoric removes critical issues of public concern from the
scope o f public debate. Namely, latent and growing threats to US national security may
originate from within the Saudi state. Yet, when questioned about these threats, officials
reiterate essentially narrative responses that only reinforce the good vs. evil framing of
the war on terror and subsequently position the Saudis as helping rather than harming this
effort. After B ush’s April 25 address (2002), he gave the following response to question
about Saudi support for terrorism:
[Reporter]:... You said that the Crown Prince is against terror... Do you believe
the leadership is doing enough to deal with their own problems with terrorism that
comes out of their own country? Fifteen of the 19 hijackers—
[Bush]: Yes, I— the Crown Prince has been very strong in condemning the murder
o f US citizens. H e’s been very strong about condemning those who committed
those murders. ... Right after 9/11, he was one of the strongest voices of
condemnation. He understands how devious Osama bin Laden has b een ...
This passage responds to the issue of Saudi terrorism by simply reiterating the ‘peace
maker’ narrative attached to the Crown Prince. Emphasizing Abdullah’s condemnation
of terror, Bush implies that because the Crown Prince denounces terror publicly, that 1)
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he can prevent it from occurring in his regime, and 2) he receives support in this effort
from the rest of Saudi leaders. The truth of Saudi stability is quite different than it
appears here. The public is left to assume that, like the President of the United States, the
de-facto ruler of Saudi Arabia enjoys the same latitude of influence over public policy
and state administration when this is far from the truth.
As outlined by Clarke (2004), Crile (2003), Coll (2004), and Schwartz (2003), the
Saudi regime is greatly divided between pro- and anti-western advocates. Some, like
Saudi Ambassador to the US and long-time Bush associate Prince Bandar bin Sultan, or
Crown Prince Abdullah, enjoy warm and positive relations with the west. Others in the
family however denounce US customs, policy, and culture while openly admiring figures
like Osama bin Laden and supporting religious groups closely associated with Muslim
terrorist groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, and others (Baer, 2003;
Clarke, 2004; Schwartz, 2003). In short, there is a great divide in terms of US support
within the Saudi regime, and this division is not apparent in any of the W hite House’s
statements about Saudi leadership, cooperation in the war on terror, or any other issue
related to the relationship in even the most general terms. The adm inistration’s
descriptive account of this partnership obscures the conflicts within Saudi Arabia over
their relationship with the US.
Third, and most important, is the impact of value-oriented rhetorical strategies
that obscure moral ambiguity. Domestication and prophetic dualism, as outlined in the
literature review and textual analysis sections, are collections of appeals that describe the
US-Saudi partnership through value-oriented metaphors. The one-sided construction of
prophetic dualism emphasizes the positive or ‘good’ in the relationship and puts a moral
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spin on the relationship. As we see from the history chapter, the underlying interests of
the partnership are encumbered with moral ambiguity that is difficult to resolve. The
case o f Osama bin Laden is a most salient example of this ambiguity.
On the one hand, bin Laden served a valuable role in the clandestine war against
the Soviets. On the other hand, he was the alleged mastermind behind the events of 9-11
and is now the U S’s most wanted fugitive (Coll, 2004). This is one of many cases that
show the murky moral substance o f the relationship. We see similar examples in the
cases of the Iran-Iraq war, the political and financial relationships between the Bushes
and the Saudi royal family, and most recently in the issue of Saudi cooperation in the war
on terror. As it relates to the rhetorical strategies employed by White House officials, the
‘real’ nature of US-Saudi diplomacy entails complexities, nuances, overlapping interests,
secrecy, and moral ambiguity that cannot receive adequate development in the simplistic
narratives used by public officials to support US policy toward Saudi Arabia. In short,
White House rhetoric obscures much of the true substance of the relationship in favor of
a more simplistic, palatable account.

Prophetic Dualism and the War on Terror: Re-Telling the Cold War Drama
W ith reference to RQ2, White House rhetoric adapted two rhetorical strategies.
The first is W ander’s (1984) prophetic dualism, which relies upon a moral dichotomy
between good and evil, right and wrong, etc. As one notices from the analysis chapter,
much of the White H ouse’s rhetoric focuses on constructing the positive or good side of
this dichotomy. Although other official rhetoric mentions America’s fight against
terrorism, evildoers, murderers and the like, in the context of US-Saudi relations, it more
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frequently frames these issues in terms of ‘the good’ -peace, partnership, vision,
leadership, and others. W hether talking about world peace, middle-east peace, visionary
leadership, or Arab multilateralism, the White House allocates most of its rhetorical
resources to constructing notions of these ‘goods.’ In doing'so, officials take every effort
to develop narratives and build ideas about good people (Bush and the Crown Prince, the
US and the Saudis, etc.) doing good things -partners for peace, partners against terrorism,
and others.
This emphasis on the ‘good’ is a noteworthy adaptation for two reasons. First, it
signals the lasting reverberation of the White House’s moralistic framing following 9-11.
As outlined by Bostdorff (2003), George Bush’s rhetoric after 9-11 appealed to the notion
of America’s “national covenant,” a strategy that was based on a puritanical moral
framing of the 9-11 attacks which posited a good vs. evil ‘crusade’ against ‘evildoers’
(293). Eventually, when Bush gave his State of the Union address, just months after the
attacks, his introduction of the ‘axis of evil’ metaphor propelled the use of moral framing
in descriptions of international conflict and foreign policy. As discussed in the analysis
chapter, Bush’s introduction of the ‘Axis of Evil’ signaled a new rendition of the Cold
W ar drama that encapsulated national actors in a good vs. evil struggle against ruthless
murders intending imminent harm against the free world (Bush, Jan. 29, 2002). As it
relates to White House rhetoric after the Crawford meeting, B ush’s moral framing of 911 provided an implicit rhetorical backdrop that allowed official rhetoric to construct
appeals with reference to a pre-established evil. Whereas some strategies might contain
appeals to both good and evil, the latter theme had already been established in the
President’s 2002 state of the Union Address.
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With the ‘evil’ already established, officials focused on creating the other half of
the dualism. Within an isolated period of time, the White H ouse’s focus on constructing
the ‘good’ side o f this dualism frames a number o f isolated issues like the US-Saudi
relationship, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Arab multilateralism in light of the
broader war on terror. The US-Saudi partnership, for example, seems to have more to do
with the crusade against terrorism than it does with any of the underlying issues that have
guided the relationship since its founding. The convenience of the war on terror lies in its
ability to frame a number of unrelated foreign policy issues under a pre-established
rhetoric of good vs. evil. While this framing helps facilitate a one-sided construction of
W ander’s prophetic dualism (1984), it also helps officials re-cast a Cold W ar narrative
within a new historical context.
The second hallmark of official rhetoric appears in the retelling of Stuckey’s
(1995) Cold W ar drama within a new and entirely different geopolitical landscape where
the U S’s enemies have been framed under a new battle against global terror. One of the
most salient features of the Cold W ar drama is that it was a somewhat accurate picture of
the Cold W ar relations between two major world powers, the US and the Soviet Union.
We could understand how it was indeed a ‘cold’ war; we fought invisible enemies within
the contexts of deniable clandestine operations at the same time with a clear and
identifiable enemy. The US and Soviets avoided firing missiles at one another, yet the
US launched the CIA ’s largest and most successful clandestine proxy war of the 20th
century in areas like Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America (Crile, 2003, ix-x;
Croll, 2004). Battles were largely invisible to the public; they resulted in covert
assassinations, kidnappings, treason, defection, and deniable US support for guerilla
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warfare in regional proxy battles like those in Afghanistan, which contributed -som e say
lead, to the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union (Crile, 2003; Coll, 2004). Perhaps we
called it the Cold W ar because if it ever became “hot,” the world would potentially
crumble in the wake of full-scale nuclear engagement. In the end, the US was fighting a
clearly defined state actor.
On the other hand, the war on terror is very much a “hot” war metaphorically
speaking. In addition to silent clandestine victories in intelligence gathering, molefinding, and other cloak-and-dagger activities, the war on terror by contrast produces very
visible results. We see evidence of captured al-Qaeda operatives, invasions in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the daily death tolls of both US and enemy combatants in the
headlines of the New York Times. Although the public can see an identifiable enemy
and tangible battles, they cannot attach an army to a particular national actor. While
certain states sponsor terrorism, one particular state does not encompass the entire threat.
The President’s ‘Axis of Evil,’ for example, mentions three State actors -Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea—but even without the influence of these states, terrorists would still enjoy a
wide range of support in the Arab world (Schwartz, 2003; Clarke, 2004).
Unlike the Cold War, the W ar on Terror adds ambiguity to the notion o f a State
threat to national security, and more deeply undermines the notion of a ‘Cold’ war where
the US was fighting an easily identifiable state threat. Despite the historical
inconsistencies between the Cold W ar and the W ar on Terror metaphors, official rhetoric
effectively recasts the narrative of an old struggle to meet new international
circumstances. The good vs. evil framing via prophetic dualism emerges as the most
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prominent frame for the U S’s war on terror, and hence, describes several isolated foreign
policy issues like the US-Saudi partnership, Middle-East peace, and others.
The fact that White House rhetoric pays such great attention to constructing
W ander’s (1984) prophetic dualism indicates this strategy’s versatility in repositioning
foreign policy issues in respect to particular historical developments. For example, by
emphasizing the importance of US-Saudi relations to the cause of world peace and
M iddle-East peace, the role of Arab multi-lateralism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or
the need for our best allies to publicly condemn terrorism, the White House uses
particular historical developments to contrast its construction of ‘the good’ in light of ‘the
bad.’ The use of this moral framing, however, seems to suggest that White House
officials may view their foreign policy decisions through a similar moral lens.
To adapt their rhetorical strategies, officials rely upon this moral framework
provided by the ‘Axis of Evil,’ and the descriptions of the terrorist threat found in the
President’s 2000 State of the Union address to provide background for a ‘good’ effort
against evil. The frequent use of this morally dichotomous framing indicates that
morality is, to some extent, a foundational consideration for this Administration’s foreign
policy decision-making. In her address at Johns Hopkins University, shortly after the
Crawford address, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained the
Administration’s reliance upon moral rationale in its foreign policy decisions:
America... will use [its] influence to favor freedom. There are right and wrong
choices and right and wrong acts. And governments are making them every day
for their own people and for the people of the world. We can never let the
intricacies of cloistered debate - with its many hues of gray and nuance - obscure
the need to speak and act with moral clarity. We must recognize that some states
or leaders will choose wrongly. We must recognize that truly evil regimes will
never be reformed...
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Nations must decide which side they are on in the fault line that divides
civilization from terror. They must decide whether to embrace the paradigm of
progress: democracy and freedom and human rights, and clean limited
government. (April 29, 2002)
Rice speaks about a division between a civilized world and a terrorized one; she speaks
of right and wrong, good and evil, and implies a with-us-or-against-us view of
international relations. She describes the importance of moral clarity and a reminder that
officials should “never let the intricacies of cloistered debate -w ith its many hues of gray
and nuance— obscure” this importance (April 29, 2002). While her moral vision is quite
explicit, the more pertinent issue is the degree to which this moral framing influences her,
and other White House decision makers’, foreign policy decisions.
Later, Rice addressed this issue. When a reporter questioned the W hite H ouse’s
reliance on moral dichotomies to explain international policy, they pointed out, “you
[Rice] use a lot of moral dichotomies -th e re ’s a fault line, there’s the good, the evil... but
it seems that the realities of foreign policy are much more complicated,” and he gave an
example of this complication by stating that, “America has to engage with some regimes
that are either anti-democratic, like Saudi Arabia, or with dubious moral records, [like]
Israel” (April 29, 2002). After explaining the statement, the reporter asked, do “you feel
that this moral rhetoric... createfs] a perception of hypocrisy and threatens America’s
credibility?” (April 29). To this pointed question, Rice offered a response that says much
about the Official framing of foreign policy decisions when she stated:
Look, the truth of the matter is, though, unless you know where you’re going,
unless you’re clear about where you’re going, you will go nowhere. And what
moral clarity gives you is a compass against which to measure everything else because you’re right, it is a complex world, it’s a hard world. The complexities
bring you into different kinds of situations in which different tactics are
important.
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But if you ever lose sight of what you think is wrong and what is right, then you
have nothing to guide you. And if you ever lose sight of the fact that there is
wrong and right, you have nothing to guide you. (April 29)
Her emphasis on moral “compass” indicates that morality serves as a kind of interpretive
lens for official decision making. Morality becomes a concept through which the
complex world of international affairs can be interpreted. Rice seems to disdain the
“cloistered debate” and its “hues of gray and nuance,” which helps illustrate her
preference for easily-discernable values. If anything, the role of moral framing helps
decision makers by clearing up the ambiguities and complexities that come along with all
foreign policy decisions. In terms of its influence on the Administration’s framing of
foreign policy issues, the US-Saudi partnership in particular, this sense of moral clarity is
most evident in their public justifications for policy. So if Rice’s depiction of morality
and its role in decision making is correct, then her comments help explain the substance
and framing of official rhetoric.
In terms of its importance to communication theory, the emphasis on constructing
‘the good’ within a dichotomous moral framing indicates an important adaptation of both
prophetic dualism (Wander, 1984) and the Cold War drama (Stuckey, 1995). Here,
theorists should note a re-configuration of the Cold W ar drama to fit new historical
trends. Through the one-sided construction of W ander’s prophetic dualism, official
rhetoric effectively recasts the Cold W ar narrative to include a new set of historical
realities. This suggests that moralistic dramatized descriptions of foreign policy issues
can be retold in many different historical circumstances regardless of their congruence
with reality. Although scholars may argue over the efficacy with which the
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administration employs this strategy, its appearance in the Crawford and post-Crawford
addresses remains a salient feature of White House rhetoric on the US-Saudi partnership.

Domestication and Personification
A second strategy seen in the post-Crawford addresses indicates an expanded
version of Schiappa’s (1989) domestication strategy that makes use o f relational
metaphors. As discussed in the analysis, descriptive themes like partnership, mutual
respect, appreciation, family, personal bonding, male bonding, western hospitality, and
the like, all domesticate the relationship. Although these themes certainly facilitate a
domestication of the relationship by relying upon simplistic metaphors drawn from
“ordinary language” (1989), these descriptive appeals go beyond simplifying a
complicated relationship insofar as they construct a persona or an impression of the
relationship that personifies both the content and characters involved in the partnership.
Crown Prince Abdallah, for example, is the subject of very glowing descriptions as a
peace visionary, a partner, man of “enormous influence,” a family friend, even “a man
w ho’s got a farm and understands the land,” and all reiterate his positive personal
qualities that make him such a distinguished partner to the US, especially when
contrasted with Yasir Arafat as discussed above (Bush, April 25).
Domesticating the Crown Prince also ‘W esternizes’ and de-orientalizes him. As
discussed in Chapter III, Americans were skeptical of a country that produced the 9-11
hijackers and Osama bin Laden. In many ways, few Americans had come to appreciate
the values, history, and cultural nuances of the Arab world, opting for the images and
stereotypes they saw on Television and in films. Therefore, as a visual rhetoric, the
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appearance of the Saudi Crown Prince alongside President Bush at the Crawford Ranch
had a subtle but powerful appeal to certain domestic audiences. The westernized
appearance of the talks helped Americans relate to the Crown Prince as someone who
was ‘just like us.’ As President Bush explained, the Crown Prince had a ranch and knew
the land, just like a Midwestern farmer or a farm hand. In the W hite House’s rendition of
the visit, the Crown Prince became a character in a narrative that took place on a western
landscape - a ranch in Texas nonetheless. Likening the Crown Prince to westerners via
the ranch motif, Bush delivered the subtle message that the Crown Prince -an d the Saudis
by association, are just like us. White House rhetoric, therefore, created an impression of
the Prince that was familiar and friendly, just as Bush described him. This rhetoric
‘westernized’ the Saudis to help improve their image with domestic audiences.
In sum, however, these characterizations and personifications of the Crown Prince
and the Saudis functioned rhetorically in a manner that has not been fully explored by
foreign policy scholars. By creating specific descriptions of national actors and
diplomatic relationships, the domestication strategy seen in the analysis chapter include
issues of personification that make it distinct from Schiappa’s original rendition. In sum,
the Administration’s use of relational metaphors to domesticate the US-Saudi partnership
indicates a new form of domestication as it attempts to personify the relationship.
Additionally, the ‘westernizing’ of the Arab Prince showed an equally innovative
rhetorical technique. For these reasons, foreign policy scholars should add
personification and westernization to any list of strategic metaphors used to domesticate
particular foreign policy issues.
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More generally, the use of metaphors and narrative as a substitute for a factual
account of US-Saudi diplomacy distorts the true nature of the relationship. A story about
good and evil, the war on terror, and the partnership for peace, reads like a novel. It
entertains more than it informs. White House rhetoric describes US-Saudi relations like a
wild west novel as it distinguishes the good characters from the bad in an effort to
simplify the history of a complex multifaceted relationship into a quick dramatic sound
bite. In the end, domestication and prophetic dualism turn a factual historical relationship
into an easily-digestible tale about two partners waging a war against terror. It says
nothing, for example, about how many of the 9-11 hijackers emerged from Saudi Arabia.
Nor does explain the considerable ambiguity surrounding Osama bin Laden, who at one
time was the U S’s front-man in the war against the Soviets. Neither does it identify the
murky relationship between Saudi oil, W estern industry, and US foreign policy. It also
fails to describe the strategic services offered by the Saudi Kingdom. And while it
obscures the reality of the relationship, W hite House rhetoric also severely limits the
public’s understanding of a vital foreign policy issue that impacts US national security.
By limiting the public’s understanding of the US-Saudi relationship, W hite House
rhetoric removes a paramount topic from public discourse and criticism. Because the
Saudis are so deeply tied to US national security interests, their role in US foreign policy
should command a leading position in public discourse. Instead, the Saudi role is either
over-simplified, distorted, or narrowly criticized. White House rhetoric certainly
commits the first two of these tactics while contributing to the third. The Michael
Moores of the world will continually assail the relationship without a fuller understanding
of its historical and strategic underpinnings, yet, White House rhetoric, with its emphasis
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on distorted narratives and over-simplified renditions of history, seems to only invite
such criticism.
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